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ABSTRACT

Predicting Airline Corporate Bankruptcies
Using a Modified Altman
Z-Seore Model

by

Carla Kroeze
Dr. Karl Mayer, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Hotel Administration
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Since 1979, 150 airlines have filed for bankruptcy. The airline industry was officially
deregulated in October 1978, which brought about many changes including the
strengthening o f hub and spoke operations, fare-cutting, and the entry o f new competitors
into the industry.

However, following deregulation, the airline industry has suffered

financially from various problems: the economic recession o f the early 1980s; rising jet
fuel costs; rising labor costs; maintenance and interest costs; rising insurance costs; and
intensified competition. The transition, from a regulated to a deregulated environment,
increased the instability o f the carriers’ operating profits. In 1998, airlines earned record
profits, but by 2002, only two o f the major carriers turned a profit. Since 1998, six major
or national North American airlines filed for bankruptcy.

Ill
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The objective o f this study was to analyze bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines using a
traditional bankruptcy prediction model, the Altman Z-score model, in order to evaluate
its ability to predict financial distress in the airline industry. The four financial ratios
used in the model represented liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity, and
solvency.

A second objective of this study was to develop and test a new statistical

model that would better differentiate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines.
The new model used only three variables, predicted membership to only one of two
groups, and used a simple zero as a cut-off to distinguish whether a firm belonged to the
bankrupt group or the non-bankrupt group. Furthermore, the new model’s predictions
were accurate up to four years in advance of a bankruptcy filing. The Z ” model, on the
other hand, used four variables, did not always give a classification to one o f two groups,
and used two cut-offs. Furthermore, it performed no better than a naïve prediction in
determining whether an airline firm should be classified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
In 1998, airlines earned record profits, but by 2002, only two o f tbe major carriers
turned a profit. What happened? Over capacity, higher fuel prices, recession, terrorism,
war, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), high competition, declining traffic,
and bad management have contributed to a six-year financial roller-coaster ride for the
airline industry (Airline Industry Survey, 2003).
Since 1979, 150 airlines have filed for bankruptcy (United Airlines Annual Report,
2003). The airline industry was officially deregulated in October 1978, which brought
about many changes including the strengthening o f hub and spoke operations, farecutting, and the entry o f new competitors into the industry.

However, following

deregulation, the airline industry has suffered financially from various problems: the
economic recession o f the early 1980s; rising jet fuel costs; rising labor costs;
maintenance and interest costs; foreign exchange risk; rising insurance costs; and,
intensified competition. The transition, from a regulated to a deregulated environment,
increased the instability o f the carriers’ operating profits. Total risk (i.e., the volatility of
net profits over time) increased dramatically in the airline industry.
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There have been a number studies using the Altman Z-Score Model to predict airline
bankruptcy and financial distress; such studies were completed in 1974, 1982, 1986,
1992, 1996, and 2000. In 1986, Altman’s Z-Score model was tested to see if it could
accurately predict airline bankruptcy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 2003, a

doctoral dissertation was completed using the 1993 revised Altman Z”-Score model to
determine the level o f predictive accuracy between bankrupt and non-bankrupt publicly
traded firms in the service industry (Hanson, 2003).

A ltm an’s 1993 model correctly

classified bankrupt service companies 92 percent, 69 percent, and 54 percent for years
one, two, and three respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to continue to use this model for
the current analysis o f airlines, with the addition o f several cash flow variables.
However, given the severe industry conditions and unpredictable events o f the last six
years, it is uncertain whether the Altman Model is still valid in assessing airline financial
fitness.

Furthermore, the Altman Z-Score model was revised in 1993 to a 4-variable

model for nonmanufacturing firms, and this 4-variable model has not been tested on the
airline industry. It may be the case that this 1993 model provides a better prediction than
the 1968 model for predicting airline bankruptcies.
In late 2001, The United States (US) Congress formed the Air Transport Stabilization
Board (ATSB), whose job was to dole out as much as $10 billion in loan guarantees to
airlines unable to borrow in traditional credit markets after the September 11 terrorist
hijackings (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).

America West Airlines was the first to

apply for and receive the guarantees. US Airways Chief Executive David N. Siegel said
in his letter to employees, “we will file an application with the ATSB for a loan guarantee
since we have no other access to additional funding while we restructure the airline.”
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The ATSB approved $900 million in backing for $1 billion in private loans to US
Airways, provided that the airline obtain significant cuts. US Airways later filed for
bankruptcy. United Airlines, the nation’s second-largest carrier, applied for $1.8 billion
in ATSB loan guarantees, but had already racked up $678 million in losses before the
terrorist attacks. United’s application was not approved.

It later filed for Chapter 11

bankruptcy protection (Maynard, 2004).
Other major or national airlines that have either received the federal loan bailout, filed
for bankruptcy, or both, include AT A, Frontier, TWA, Hawaiian Air, and Air Canada.
TWA is no longer operating; it flew its last official flight on December 1, 2001.
The airline industry is a cyclical industry.

It is very vulnerable to economic

downturns. The airline industry is characterized by both high capital costs and high labor
costs. Labor costs account for about 36 percent to 40 percent o f total operating expenses
(Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). Airlines are also energy-intensive operations. Fuel
expenses are apt to remain near historical highs for the foreseeable future.

Airline

companies typically carry a significant amount o f debt, contributing to their high fixed
cost capital structures. When business drops off and costs are not covered, the result can
be reorganization in bankruptcy, liquidation, or in recent cases o f airline financial
distress, the use o f government loan bail-outs. The big airlines have been reeling since
2001, together posting more than $24 billion o f dollars o f losses due in part to constricted
demand and higb costs (Maynard, 2004).
The industry is highly volatile and is known for its propensity for financial distress.
Stockholders, bondholders, other creditors, financial analysts, government regulatory
bodies, and the traveling public need the ability to asses the level o f financial distress that
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prevails in the industry (Davalos, Gritta, and Chow, 1999). For this reason, models that
can forecast financial distress are useful. Financial distress can be predicted one, two,
and sometimes three years ahead of its occurrence using traditional financial ratios with
statistical analysis (Altman, 1993).
If there were a means o f predicting the combinations o f characteristics that are likely
to fail, corrective measures could be taken to alter their underlying problems, redefine
strategies and procedures, or in some instances, avoid or reduce investments in
questionable firms that cannot be salvaged (Patterson, 2001). One method of predicting
financial distress that has been widely used for over 35 years is the statistical bankruptcy
prediction model, first presented by Altman (1968). Altm an’s model (Altman Z-Score
Model) is a popular approach for not only forecasting bankruptcy in advance o f the event,
but also for gauging the overall financial condition o f a firm.
The Altman Z-Score Model uses five financial ratios to represent the elements of
failure prediction.

These elements are liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity,

solvency, and activity. Multiple discriminant analysis, a statistical technique, is applied
to the financial ratios. The primary objectives o f multiple discriminate analyses are to
understand group differences and to predict the likelihood than an entity (individual or
object) will belong to a particular class or group based on several metric variables (Hair,
Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998).

In this case, the two groups are financially

distressed and non-financially distressed airlines, and the metric variables are the airlines’
financial ratios. Altman (1993) revised the model to a four-variable multiple discriminate
model for nonmanufacturing firms, which is called the Z”-Score Model.
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The four

financial ratios used in the model represent liquidity, cumulative profitability,
productivity, and solvency.
This dissertation tests the Altman Z”-Score Model to see if it could have accurately
predicted

airline

bankruptcy/financial

distress

over

a

recent

six-year

period.

Additionally, this dissertation seeks to revise the Altman Z”-Score Model so that it may
be successfully applied to the evolving landscape o f the airline industry.

Statement of Objectives
The objective of this study to analyze bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines using a
traditional bankruptcy prediction model in order to evaluate its ability to predict
bankruptcy in the airline industry. The second objective was to develop and test a revised
bankruptcy prediction model that would better differentiate between airlines that are
likely to fail and those that are not likely to fail, by comparing the new model’s
classification rate with the rate from the existing Z”-score model.

Hypotheses
The hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation are as follows:
H I q: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood of bankruptcy for an airline firm.
HI a: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2 q: a revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”score model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
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H2 a : a revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-Score
model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.

Justifications o f the Study
Several different statistical techniques have been used in the past to assess airline
financial performance: multiple discriminant analysis (Gritta, 1974 and 1982; Scaggs,
1986 Golaszewski, 1992; Chung and Szenberg, 1996); logistic regression (Gudmundsson,
1999; Gudmundsson, 2002); and, a neural network approach (Davalos, Gritta, and Chow,
1999; Gritta, Wang, Davalos, and Chow, 2000). Although the neural network approach
predicted bankruptcy risk well, it is unlikely that individual investors, passengers, airport
authorities, or airline management will be using artificial intelligence in the near future
for this purpose.
Therefore, it was suggested that a revised model be developed and tested on existing
airline businesses. A revised model can include one or more ratios that were not included
in the earlier models, especially cash flow related ratios. From a practical standpoint, it
makes good sense to include information about cash flows and fofal debf in a bankrupfcy
predicfion. When a company lacks sufficient cash flow fo make ifs debf paymenfs, if is in
defaulf and must either reorganize or liquidate.
All public corporations are required to submit a Statement o f Cash Flow (SCF) in
their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. The SCF can yield some very
valuable information, and it is possible that some o f that information could be used to
improve the results o f the Altman Z”-Score Model. In fact, one bankruptcy prediction
model developed by Beaver (1966) states that the cash flow fo debf ratio was the best

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

single ratio predictor. Altman did not include this ratio because o f the lack of consistent
and precise depreciation data available from public firms. Among companies in the same
industry, however, it may be possible to obtain sufficient information that will allow a
revised Altman model to also include cash flow ratios. Thus, an up-to-date analysis of
airlines can help to predict the next major or national airline failure.
There has not been a study applying the 1993 Altman Z”-Score model to the airline
industry. Additionally, there has not been a prediction model for airlines that included
cash flow variables, which are relevant factors in bankruptcy/financial distress. The goal
o f this dissertation was to develop a model that identifies the key elements of airline
bankruptcy/financial distress. Such a model should be valuable to industry practitioners
and academics alike.

Thus, this research will add useful knowledge to both the

transportation and financial literature.

Limitations o f the Study
There are a number o f limitations involved in this study.

First, this analysis was

limited by the availability o f financial data on airlines. Only publicly traded corporations
are required to make their financial statements available to everyone. Therefore, only
publicly traded airlines were part o f this study. The data used in this study was limited to
that which is available in filings with the SEC.
A second limitation is the consistency o f the data that is available. For example, some
o f the airlines rely on leasing arrangements to obtain jets, which are the most important
assets for an airline.

Other airlines have purchased their jets, using long-term debt
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financing.

This leasing versus ownership difference may have an impact on the

presentation of an airline’s balance sheet accounts.
A third limitation was the use o f ratio analysis.

Ratios are extremely useful to

owners, creditors, and management in evaluating the financial condition of airlines.
Ratios, however, are only indicators. Ratios do not reveal exactly what the problem is.
Ratios only indicate that there may be a problem; in this case, much more investigation
and analysis are required.

Delimitations o f the Study
There were also several delimitations involved in this dissertation. First, the sample
used in this study consisted o f the Department o f Transportation (DOT) classification
known as major and national air carriers in North America. DOT defines major carriers
as those airline firms that earn revenues o f more than $1 billion per year, whereas
national carriers include airline firms that earn revenues o f $100 million to $1 billion per
year.

Second was the use o f traditional financial ratios to analyze the airline firms’

financial performance.

This study does not use load factors, or other airline industry

specific ratios, as used by Chow, Gritta, and Leung (1991).

Third, there were

delimitations associated with the choice o f multiple discriminant analysis, which will be
discussed in Chapter 3 o f this dissertation. Several kinds o f statistical analysis have been
used in bankruptcy prediction models, including univariate analysis (Beaver, 1967),
multiple discriminate analysis (Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Edmister, 1972), logit
analysis (Ohlson,

1980; Zavgren,

1985; Gentry, Newbold and Whitford,

1985;

Gudmundsson, 2002), probit analysis (Grablowsky and Talley, 1981), and neural network
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analysis (Tam, 1991; Tam and Kiang, 1992; Gritta, Wang, Davalos, and Chow, 2000).
Only multiple discriminant analysis was used in this study, in spite o f its limitations as a
statistical

technique,

including

sensitivity to

outliers,

linearity,

normality,

and

homogeneity o f variances. This method has been used in more studies tban any other
method and has consistently produced the most accurate prediction/classification
accuracy.

Definitions
A priori probabilities —Probabilities tbat are based on prior knowledge about the sample.
In an analysis where there are two equal-sized groups o f cases, the a priori
probability of a case, chosen at random, being classified into the correct group, is
50 percent.
Bankrupt —A debtor that, upon voluntary petition or one invoked by the debtor’s
creditors, is judged legally insolvent.
Classification Accuracy —The percentage of cases that are classified into the correct
group using a prediction model.
Collinearity —Expression o f the relationship between two (collinearity) or more
independent variables (multicollinearity). Collinearity exists when there is a
statistical relationship between two independent variables.
Default —Failure to make required debt payments on a timely basis or to comply with
other conditions o f an obligation or agreement.
Failure —A firm that has been a subject o f bankruptcy proceedings, either voluntary or
involuntary.
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Liquidation - The sale o f a firm’s assets, payment o f outstanding debts, distribution of
the remainder to shareholders, and going out o f business; Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis —A statistical analysis technique for distinguishing
among defined groups by developing a linear combination o f discriminating
independent variables. The goal o f multiple discriminant analysis is to predict
group membership from a set o f predictors.
Non-bankrupt —A debtor that has not been the subject o f bankruptcy proceedings.
Reorganization —The action that may allow a company to emerge from Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Reorganization may consist o f a series o f agreements between the
firm, its creditors, and the court which allow for the company to repay its debts
and alter its structure to prevent the same event from arising again.
Revenue Passenger Miles —A measure o f an airline’s traffic. It refers to how many of an
airline’s available seats were actually sold.
Univariate Analysis —A statistical technique to determine, on the basis of one dependent
measure, whether samples are from populations with equal means.

Organization o f the Dissertation
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes background for the
problem statement, the problem statement, hypotheses to be tested, delimitations o f the
study, and definitions o f certain terms. Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is relevant to
the study. Chapter 3 describes the data collected for use in the analysis and the methods
that were used to construct the predictive model. Chapter 4 presents the model that was
developed to predict failure or non-failure, the results o f the prediction, and the tests of
the research hypotheses. Tests o f airlines that are not included in the development o f the

10
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model are used to validate the model. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the test and
offers conclusions, implications, and recommendations for further research.

11
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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The literature review contained in this Chapter will provide a brief history and
background o f the airline industry, information on airline industry economics,
background on the Altman Z-score bankruptcy prediction model, the Z-score model, a
review o f studies on airline bankruptcy prediction which used the Z-Score model, and
other bankruptcy prediction models.

The U.S. Airline Industry— A Historical Perspective
In 1903, the W right brothers’ first successful flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina
marked the beginning o f the aviation industry.

The industry became more developed

with the United States’ participation in World W ar I. In 1927, Charles Lindberg’s solo
flight across that Atlantic Ocean created massive public interest in flying (Boyd, 1999).
After this, air transport companies were started, including American Airways, which
later became American Airlines, as well as Boeing, and United Aircraft and
Transportation Corporation, which later became United Airlines.
The US Postal Service provided the opportunity for private aircraft to function as
mail carriers.

This proved to be one o f the biggest factors in the growth of the air

transportation industry. Passenger service was also initiated as a way to augment the

12
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incomes o f the firms providing airmail services. Passenger volume grew, and the number
of start-up airlines multiplied (Boyd, 1999).
During these early years o f the aviation industry, as air traffic became more and
more disorganized, it became apparent that air traffic rules were needed. In 1938, the
Civil Aeronautics Authority, an independent regulatory bureau, was developed. By that
date, many air transport companies were flying the new DC-3s, which were created to
carry both mail and passengers. They could seat 21 passengers (Boyd, 1999).
In World War II, the U.S. sent commercial planes and pilots to Europe to participate
in the war. The war generated support for development o f new aircraft, which would also
benefit post-war commercial aviation. By the 1950s, there were dramatic improvements
in capacity and comfort on commercial planes. Jet service was introduced in 1959, which
made for the fastest cross-country service available.

Following some serious mid-air

collisions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was created to develop an air
traffic control system.
During the 1970s, fuel prices escalated.

This was the time o f the worldwide oil

embargo. By then, Boeing had developed the first widebodied jet, the 747 jumbo, which
had 385 seats compared with only 119 for the Boeing 707s that they replaced (Banks,
1982).

However, the most dramatic event to change the industry, up to that point,

occurred in 1978: deregulation.
The Airline Deregulation Act eased the entry o f new airline companies into the
business and gave them the freedom to set their own fares and fly the routes they chose.
Deregulation resulted in the growth o f smaller, low-cost carriers and the mergers o f larger
carriers. Costs were reduced by using nonunion labor, smaller used planes, and shorter

13
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routes (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986). Air fares plummeted, and new routes opened. More
cities than ever were serviced. Increased competition, lower fares, and expanded routes
led to an increased demand for airline travel.

In the mid-1970s, the major North

American carriers flew 130 billion revenue passenger miles. By 1988, after a decade of
deregulation, the number of revenue passenger miles had reached 330 billion (“The
Airline Industry,” 2000).
The airline industry was also affected by rising jet fuel costs, labor costs, and
maintenance and interest costs associated with maintaining and/or replacing an aging
fleet (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986).

The airline industry experienced its first drop in

passenger numbers in a decade in 1989. Between 1989 and 1992, the industry lost about
$10 billion. The G ulf W ar o f 1991 and an economic recession had a devastating impact
on the number o f passengers flying and on airline revenues. High debt levels plagued the
industry (Chow, Gritta, & Hockstein, 1988). Pan American and Eastern went bankrupt
and were liquidated. Trans World Airlines (TWA) and Continental filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 and reorganized.
After the economic recession o f the early 1990s, new firms continued to enter the
market. Most o f these airlines competed with limited route structures and lower fares
than the major carriers. Expansion and health returned to the industry by 1995. In 1997
and 1998, virtually all U.S. and Canadian carriers bit record profit levels.
By the beginning o f 2001, the eight major U.S. airlines were feeling the effects of
another economic recession. The terrorist attacks o f September 11, 2001 on the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC had a terrible
impact on the U.S. domestic and global airline industries. U.S. Airlines were grounded
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for several days and many people cancelled their travel plans.

Many airlines went

bankrupt; others were forced to seek government-backed loans through the Federal
Stabilization Act (Maynard & Atlas, 2002).
In late 2001, the U.S. Congress formed the Air Transport Stabilization Board
(ATSB), whose job was to dole out as much as $10 hillion in loan guarantees to airlines
unable to borrow in traditional eredit markets after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
hijackings. America West Airlines was the first to apply for and receive the guarantees.
US Airways Chief Executive David N. Siegel said in his letter to employees, “We will
file an application with the A.T.S.B. for a loan guarantee since we have no other access to
additional funding while we restructure the airline.” The ATSB approved $900 million in
backing for $1 billion in private loans to US Airways, provided that they obtain
significant cost cuts. However, US Airways later filed for bankruptcy. United Airlines,
the nation’s second-largest carrier, applied for $1.8 billion in A.T.S.B. loan guarantees,
but had already racked up $678 million in losses before the terrorist attacks. United’s
application was not approved, and it later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
(Maynard, 2004). Other major or national airlines that have filed for bankruptcy include:
TWA, Hawaiian Air, and Air Canada.

TWA is no longer operating; it flew its last

official flight on December 1, 2001.
The larger, high-cost airlines were faced with increasing competition from domestic
low-cost airlines. The domestic low-cost airlines, together with consumer expectations
for lower fares, drove down revenues.

In addition, the bursting o f the technology

industry bubble in 2000 caused a substantial decline in premium business travel.
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Conditions at Air Canada typified the struggles in the industry, post-September 11,
2001.

Their revenues were decreasing, but they were prevented from significantly

reducing labor costs. According to Air Canada management, the declining economy, the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the war in Iraq, and the 2003 SARS outbreak all
combined to cause a significant reduction in consumer demand and in passenger
revenues. Management stated that most airlines have limited ability to reduce labor costs
and have relatively fixed aircraft fleet costs (“Air Canada,” 2004). This means that the
high-cost carriers were unable to bring down their costs structures to a level necessary to
respond to the decline in traffic, or to the evolving landscape o f the airline industry.
Air Canada suffered a net loss o f (in Canadian dollars) $1.3 billion in 2001, a net loss
of $828 million in 2002, and a net loss o f $1.9 billion in 2003. Restated in U.S. dollars,
these losses were approximately $950 million in 2001, $604 million in 2002, and $1.4
billion in 2003.

In the first quarter o f 2003, alternative sources o f funding were not

available. Air Canada elected to restructure its operations, debt, and capitalization under
creditor protection. It also made a concurrent petition under the U.S. bankruptcy code.
In the years 1998-2004, several major and national carriers did not file for
bankruptcy. These included AirTran (formerly Valu Jet, which was in bankruptcy after a
crash in 1996 killed 110 passengers), America West, Continental (which had filed for
bankruptcy in 1993), newcomer JetBlue, Alaska, American, Delta, Northwest, Frontier,
and industry star performer Southwest. However, not all o f these airlines are operating at
a profit today.

Most recently, AT A filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on

October 26, 2004.
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The smaller, discount operators in this group, Southwest and JetBlue, spend six cents
or less to fly a seat a mile, excluding fuel costs. The bigger airlines, however, have
higher costs o f operations.

US Airways says it costs ten cents to fly a seat a mile,

excluding fuel, and American and United spend more than 8 cents per mile. That gap is
killing the bigger carriers (McCartney, 2004).
Having reviewed a historical perspective o f the airline industry, the next section of
the chapter discusses the current economics o f the airline industry.

Industry Economics
Most analysts consider the airline industry to have a very high business risk (Gritta,
Freed, & Chow, 1998). Fixed costs are relatively high, and comprise about 25 to 30
percent o f operating revenues (Gritta, Chow, & Freed, 2003). Operating costs of a flight
depend mostly on the distance traveled, and not on the number o f passengers on board the
flight itself. Fuel expenses, a highly volatile cost factor, account for about 30 percent of
airline total costs.

Labor costs also make up a significant portion o f operating costs,

absorbing about 40 percent o f operating revenues (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
Labor costs for both the crew and ground staff are determined largely by the type of
aircraft, not by the number o f passengers. The only true variable costs in the industry are
travel agency commissions, food costs, and ticketing fees. Finally, the demand for air
travel is very cyclical, and is also subject to seasonal fluctuations. Winter weather can
reduce demand. The events o f September 11, 2001, the recession in the U.S. economy,
and the U.S. war with Iraq in 2003 have all disrupted the typical seasonality. For all
these reasons, the airline industry is considered to have high business risk.
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Airlines also have high levels o f financial risk. Financial risk is defined as the added
variability in earnings to stockholders that results from using long-term debt to finance
the firm ’s capital assets (Gritta, Freed, & Chow, 1998).

It is caused by interest and

principal payments on debt service. This risk is the result o f managerial decisions, rather
than the business environment. Interest represents a fixed charge and thereby reduces
reported profit. Also, the likelihood of financial distress increases as a firm uses more
debt in its capital structure. The airline business is very capital intensive. It requires
significant amounts o f capital to fund the acquisition o f assets, especially aircraft.
Airlines have often funded the acquisition o f aircraft by issuing debt, which is often
needed in capital intensive businesses.
The airline industry’s debt load greatly exceeds U.S. industry averages. Aircraft are
the airlines’ only money making equipment, and are among the most expensive machines
in the world.

For example, a Boeing 777 costs more than $130 million per aircraft

(Chung, 1996). The general aging of the aircraft used means higher maintenance costs
and eventual aircraft replacement. Stricter government regulations for older planes place
further burdens on those carriers who use them.
Labor costs are the highest single cost for United (“United Airlines,” 2003). Many of
the major airlines’ restrictive union agreements limit their flexibility in reducing labor
costs.

Lven Southwest has begun to experience labor problems, as employees have

begun to demand higher pay levels. Southwest’s flight attendants spent over two years in
negotiations with the airline to achieve their objectives o f improved pay and quality of
life (“Airlines Brief,” 2004).
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As a result o f the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, airline insurance premiums
have increased significantly. Commercial insurers cancelled airlines’ liability insurance
for losses resulting from what was considered acts o f war (i.e., terrorism, sabotage,
hijacking, and other similar acts), but airlines have obtained replacement coverage
through the FAA (“United Airlines,” 2003). There is no guarantee that the FAA will
continue this coverage. Passenger security costs are also expected to rise.
Most o f the major airlines maintain their operations around a “hub-and-spoke”
system. The spokes feed passengers from outlying points into a central airport, called the
‘hub’, where passengers travel to additional hubs or to their final destination.
Establishing a major hub in a city like Chicago or Atlanta is very expensive. It can cost
as much as $150 million for real estate and staffing. Some low-cost airlines, however,
have been operating differently.

Unlike other major airlines. Southwest, a low-cost

carrier, provides no fancy terminals, no costly hub-and-spoke operations, and no
amenities (Chung, 1996). The low-cost airlines together now control over a quarter of
domestic air capacity, they fly in the highest-demand markets, and their low fares are
easy to find and book on the Internet (“America W est,”2003).
The airline industry is highly competitive. Most o f the regional carriers have lower
costs structures than the major hub-and-spoke carriers.

Both business and leisure

travelers have become increasing price sensitive. The low-cost carriers continue to target
and make inroads into markets that had been the domain o f the network carriers, while
network carriers have little flexibility to respond. The discount carriers have been able to
thwart price hikes by the network carriers (“Airlines Rescinding,” 2004).
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In general, the airline industry is in a dire condition. It is dealing with the industry’s
worst downturn in history. The airline industry has yet to fully recover. Ongoing fare
cuts, declining traffic, and softness in the economy have kept the industry in a weakened
condition. Having reviewed the economics o f the airline industry, the next section of this
chapter examines the Altman Z-Score bankruptcy prediction model.

Altman Z-Score Model
The first study using financial ratios and multiple discriminant analysis to predict
business failure was completed by Altman in his doctoral dissertation. The model that he
developed correctly predicted 95 percent o f manufacturing firm bankruptcies one year
prior to failure. The model also correctly predicted 72 percent o f manufacturing firm
bankruptcies two years prior to failure (Altman, 1968).
According to Altman (1993), the detection o f company operating and financial
difficulties is a subject which has been particularly amenable to analysis with financial
ratios. Studies dating back to the 1930s concluded that failing firms exhibit significantly
different ratio measures than do continuing entities.

In general, ratios measuring

profitability, liquidity, and solvency prevailed as the most significant indicators in these
studies (Altman, 1968). Knowing which ratios to use in detecting bankruptcy potential,
and what weights should be attached to those ratios, is a question that Altman and others
have tried to answer. It is a central question that this study also investigates.
Altman used Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA), a statistical technique that
identifies the differentiating characteristics o f pre-determined groups. MDA is used to
derive a discriminant function. The discriminant function is a linear equation using a
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combination o f independent variables.

The independent variables, in Altman’s study,

were financial ratios. This equation was used to differentiate the firms studied into one of
two groups:

either bankrupt or non-bankrupt.

This analytical method has also been

applied successfully in consumer credit evaluation, in which a discriminant function,
using financial data as independent variables, classifies individuals into two groups—
credit-worthy or non-credit-worthy (Wagner, Reichert, & Cho, 1983).
Altman started with a list of 22 potentially useful ratios for evaluation. The variables
were classified into five traditional ratio categories; liquidity, cumulative profitability
over time, productivity, solvency, and activity. The ratios were chosen on the basis of
their popularity in the literature and their potential relevancy.

Using the financial

statements of 33 bankrupt corporations and 33 non-bankrupt corporations, Altman used
step-wise multiple discriminant analysis to establish which ratios would contribute the
most to an equation that would differentiate between the two groups.

The analysis

yielded a formula that used five o f the original 22 ratios as independent variables:
working capital/total assets (X i); retained earnings/total assets (X 2); earnings before
interest and taxes/total assets (X 3); market value o f equity/book value of total liabilities
(X 4);

and, sales/total assets (X 5). Collectively, these five ratios were considered “best” in

the prediction o f corporate bankruptcy. This function, shown in Table 1, did the best job
among the alternatives, which included numerous computer runs analyzing different ratio
profiles.
The dependent variable, the Z-score, maximizes the difference between the bankrupt
group and the non-bankrupt group. Altman found that firms with a Z-score o f greater
than 2.99 are classified into the non-bankrupt category, while firms with a Z-score below
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1.81 are classified as bankrupt. The area between 1.81 and 2.99 was considered a “gray
area” because o f the tendency for error classification.

If a single cutoff is desired,

Altman suggested using a Z-score o f 2.67 to classify a firm as either bankrupt or non
bankrupt.
The final discriminant function was as follows in Altm an’s original model (Altman,
1968).

Table 1
Altman Z-Score Multiple Discriminant Analysis Model

Z = .0 1 2 X 1 + .0 1 4 X 2 +.0 3 3 X 3 + .0 0 6 X 4 + .9 9 9 X 5 + 6
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X 2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4

= market value o f equity/book value o f total liabilities;

X 5 = sales/total assets;
s = error term; and,
Z = overall index.

Each of the ratios included in the model is explained below. For each ratio, a larger
Z-score correlates to non-bankruptcy; a smaller Z-score correlates to bankruptcy.
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The working capital/total assets ratio (Xi) is a measure o f the net liquid assets of the
firm relative to is total capitalization. A firm that has experienced consistent operating
losses will have shrinking current assets relative to its total assets.
Retained earnings are thought of as earned surplus. According to Altman (1968), this
measure o f cumulative profitability over time implicitly considers the age o f a firm. A
relatively young firm will probably show a low retained earnings/total assets ratio (X 2)
because it has not had time to build up its cumulative profits. The incidence of failure is
much higher in a firm’s early years.
The ratio o f earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (X 3) is a measure of the
productivity o f the firm’s assets. This ratio is the same as the traditional return on assets
(using

earnings

before

interest

and

taxes)

ratio,

which

is

an

overall

performance/profitability measure. Market value o f equity to book value of liabilities
(X 4)

is a measure that shows how much the firm’s assets can drop before its liabilities

exceed its assets and the firm becomes insolvent. Sales to total assets (X 5) measures the
sales generating ability o f the firm’s assets, which is an activity ratio.
The model was considered to be very accurate in classifying 95 percent of the total
sample correctly one year prior to bankruptcy. The model correctly classified 72 percent
o f the total sample two years prior to the event. In some cases, bankruptcy was correctly
predicted five years before the event. In addition to the general manufacturing, publicly
held firm Z-score model, Altman later developed a variation o f the model for privately
held firms (the Z ’-score model) and for nonmanufacturing industrials (the Z”-score
model).
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In 1993, Altman revised this five-variable model to the four-variable model shown
below as Table 2 (Z”-score model). In revising the original model, he changed the X4
variable to net worth (book value) divided by total liabilities. He also dropped the last
variable, X 5, and altered the coefficients of the dependent variables.
The Z”-Score Model follows (Altman, 1993).

Table 2
Altman Z ”-Score Model

Z" = 6.56 Xi + 3.26 X 2 + 6.72 X 3 + l.OSX, + é
Where;
X] = working capital/total assets;
X2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4

= book value o f equity/book value o f total liabilities;

8 = error term; and,

Z” = overall index.

This newer model uses new cutoffs for classifying a firm as bankrupt or non
bankrupt. A firm with a Z”-score o f more than 2.6 would be considered non-bankrupt; a
firm with a score below 1.1 would be considered bankrupt. The firms that score between
1.1 and 2.6 fall into the gray area, where classification is difficult (Altman, 1993).
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Both the Altman Z-Score and Z”-Score models do not include cash flow ratios.
Altman stated the cash flow to debt ratio was not considered because of the lack of
consistent and precise depreciation data. However, Beaver (1967) found that the cash
flow to debt ratio was the best single ratio predictor o f bankruptcy. Beaver stated that the
larger a firm ’s net cash flow from operations, the smaller the probability of failure. Thus,
it seems practical that a model that predicts financial distress/bankruptcy should also
include cash flow ratios to test their predictive ability.
Since 1988, publicly traded firms have been required to issue a Statement o f Cash
Flows (SCF) with other financial statements released to external users (Schmidgall,
2002). Investors and creditors use the SCF to assess the firm’s: (I) ability to pay its bills
as they come due; (2) ability to pay dividends; and, (3) need for additional financing,
including borrowing debt and selling capital stock.

Since the SCF may contain

information relevant to a prediction o f failure or non-failure, it seems appropriate to
include cash flow ratios in a new bankruptcy prediction model.
In their tests o f the generalizability o f the Z-score model, Grice and Ingram (2001)
point out that researchers assume that the model is stable across economic conditions that
change over time. However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, airline industry conditions
have changed dramatically in recent years. Changing economic conditions can affect the
accuracy, magnitude, and significance o f the Z-Score coefficients (Mensah, 1984).
Therefore, it is not likely that the Z-score model would perform equally well in all
financial periods.

These reasons suggest that a revised bankruptcy prediction model

should be developed.

Before doing so, however, this study will next discuss other

bankruptcy prediction research in the airline industry.
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Studies of Airline Bankruptcies using the Altman Z-Score Model
In 1981, Gritta (1982) accurately predicted that both Braniff and Continental would
file for bankruptcy, using the Z-score model. Gritta, Davalos, and Chow (1996) used the
Altman Z-Score Model to make airline Z-score comparisons over a very long time
horizon. The carriers were divided in to two groups: those which remained solvent over
the period o f the study, or which were solvent when merged; and, those which had failed
one or more times. They found that the model separated the two groups fairly well.
Scaggs and Crawford (1986) revised the Altman Z-Score model, not on the dependent
variable side, but on the independent variable side. They retained the single Z-score
hurdle o f 2.67, but changed the weighting o f the independent variables (i.e., the financial
ratios). Their study determined that the debt position of a firm was a significant factor in
predicting U.S. airline failure. In fact, many airlines hold high debt positions in their
capital structure, along with commensurate high interest payments. Their revised model
accurately predicted Braniff, Continental, and Air Florida’s bankruptcy three years prior
to the event during the time period 1978-1982.
However, Golaszewski and Sanders (1992) contend that many U.S. carriers can
continue to operate with lower than normal scores over the long haul. They state that
when a Z-score falls below 1.0, the airline enters the range o f concern. They also state
that a score below 0.5 indicates financial distress and the need for financial restructuring.
This cutoff is significantly lower than Altm an’s Z-Score cutoff.
Davalos, Gritta, and Chow (1999) used the variables from Altman’s 1993 model, the
Z”-Score model, but incorrectly used the cut-off scores from the 1968 Z-Score model in
their research.

Therefore, fourteen of their twenty-six classifications were incorrect.
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The results o f their study would have been the same, however, if the classifications had
been correct; their neural network approach outperformed the Z”-Score model in
predicting U.S. carrier bankruptcy.
Gritta, Davalos, and Chow (2000) built on prior studies to use the Z-score model to
track the performance o f the major air carriers over a 30-year period from 1966 to 1996.
The purpose o f their research was to asses the past and then-current health o f the carriers.
They stated that it also shed light on the importance o f the debt burden in the industry,
which has contributed to the industry’s instability over time. Next, the chapter turns to a
discussion o f other bankruptcy prediction models other than Altman’s models.

Other Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Five other researchers, Beaver (1967), Deakin (1972), Edmister (1972), Blum (1974),
and Ohlson (1980), also investigated and expanded the topic o f bankruptcy prediction in
firms. Their individual studies are discussed below.
One of the classic studies in the area o f ratio analysis and bankruptcy prediction was
completed by Beaver (1967). Beaver used univariate analysis to examine the ability of
financial ratios to predict business failure. This study set the stage for the multivariate
attempts, by Altman and others, which followed (Altman, 1993). Beaver found that a
number of indicators could discriminate between matched samples o f failed and
nonfailed firms for as long as five years prior to firm failure.
It is remarkable to note that some researchers found that cash flow data added very
little incremental value to a traditional accrual-based prediction model (Altman, 1993).
Altman felt that information from accrual statements provided adequate information.
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However, Beaver found that the best performing ratio was cash flow to total debt. It thus
seems appropriate to include a variety o f ratios, including several cash flow rafios, fo
gauge fhe recent performance o f airlines, as many o f the failed airlines applied for
government-backed loans.
Beaver’s (1967) model was based on four propositions. First, the more net liquid
assets a firm has, the smaller is the probability o f its failure. Second, the larger the net
cash flow from operations, the smaller the probability o f its failure. Third, the larger the
amount o f debt a firm has, the greater the probability o f its failure. Fourth, the larger the
amount o f liquid assets required to fund operating expenditures, the greater the
probability o f its failure.
For each o f five years prior to its failure, Beaver calculated 30 ratios. The ratios were
selected on the basis o f three criteria; ( 1) popularity in the literature; ( 2 ) performance in
previous studies; and, (3) definition o f the ratio in terms o f a “cash flow” concept. Based
on the lowest prediction error for each group (failed and non-failed) over the five-year
period, six variables performed “best” in Beaver’s (1967) study: (1) cash flow to total
debt; (2) net income to total assets; (3) total liabilities to total assets; (4) working capital
to total assets; (5) current ratio; and, ( 6 ) no-credit-interval.
Deakin’s (1972) study was developed to provide an alternative business failure model
to the initial works o f Beaver and Altman. Deakin’s results, like Beaver’s, favored the
use of the cash flow to total debt ratio as the best predictor o f bankruptcy. Another
researcher, Edmister (1972), analyzed the financial ratios of small businesses to predict
business failure. He defined a small business as one with a loan from the Small Business
Administration (SBA).

The ratios chosen were those previously used in studies by
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Beaver (1967), Altman (1968), and Blum (1974).

However, he used a zero-one

regression technique, in which the variables were transformed into categorical variables.
His method included dividing a firm ’s ratio by its respective industry average, then
converting the result into a zero-one variable, depending on an arbitrary predetermined
cutoff point.

The concept o f transforming the data into categorical variables is an

interesting contribution to the research. Edmister’s (1972) bankruptcy prediction model
is presented below as Table 3.
In Edm ister’s model, a Z-score of less than 0.47 was used to predict a firm’s failure
and a Z score o f greater than 0.53 was used was used to predict a firm ’s nonfailure. Zscores between 0.47 and 0.53 were considered a gray zone where classification was
difficult. The function predicted small business failure for 93 percent o f the cases studied
one year prior to the event.
The purpose o f Blum’s (1974) study was to aid the antitrust division o f the Justice
Department by developing a model to assess the probability o f business failure. Blum
did this by analyzing the financial and market data o f failing firms. Like Beaver, he
found that cash flow to total debt was the best predictor ratio. However, Blum did not
publish his actual formulas.
Ohlson (1980) used a logit analysis technique to predict bankruptcy. He started with
only nine ratios in his study, based on “simplicity.” Five o f those ratios included total
liabilities to total assets, working capital to total assets, current liabilities to current assets,
net income to total assets, cash flow from operation to total liabilities. He also included
data on net income and the size of the firm in terms o f total assets. Ohlson (1980) found
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that the size o f the firm was the most important predictor in his model, and the firm’s
financial structure was the second most important factor.
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Table 3
Edm ister’s Small Business Failure Discriminate Function

Z

= 0.951 - 0.523X, - 0.293X2 - 0.482X3 + 0.277X4 - 0.452Xs - 0.352Xg - 0.924X?
+ é

Where: Z = Overall Index;
X] = 1 if annual funds flow/current liabilities< 0.05, or
= 0 otherwise;
X 2 = 1 if equity/sales < 0.07, or
= 0 otherwise;
X3

= 1 if (net working capital/sales)/industry average ratio < -0.02, or
= 0 otherwise;

X4

= 1 if (current liabilities/equity)/industry average ratio < 0.48, or
= 0 otherwise;

X5

= 1 if (inventory/sales)/industry average ratio < 0.04 and has shown an upward trend,
or
= 0 otherwise;

Xô = 1 if quick ratio/industry average ratio < 0.34 and has shown a downward trend, or
= 0 otherwise;
X7

= 1 if quick ratio/industry average ratio has shown an upward trend, or
= 0 otherwise; and,

8

= error term.
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These six studies suggest that a new bankruptcy prediction model, using classic but
previously uncombined ratios, could be developed to predict bankruptcy more accurately
than in the past. This new model could be tested on bankrupt and non-bankrupt airlines,
using financial data for the six-year period 1998-2003. The ratios that would be included
in this new model will be discussed next.

New Bankruptcy Prediction Model
This section o f Chapter 2 discusses five financial ratio categories and how they relate
to financial conditions in the airline industry.

The first four financial ratio categories

were used in Altman’s Z”-Score Model (1993) as predictors o f financial distress. These
ratio categories are liquidity, cumulative profitability over time, productivity, and
solvency. The last financial ratio category, cash flow, was found by Beaver (1967) to be
the most important predictor o f financial distress.
Additionally, it may be appropriate to develop a new cut-off point for the airline
industry. Few major carriers have maintained Z-score above 2.99 for extended periods.
Many have operated for extended periods with Z-Scores close to 1.0 without entering
bankruptcy (Golaszewski & Sanders, 1992). In part, developing a new Z-score cut off
point for airlines stems from the fact that the federal government has often intervened to
bail out troubled air carriers in an effort to keep the industry afloat.

Liquidity
The ability o f a firm to meet its current obligations is important in evaluating its
financial position (Schmidgall, 2002).

Liquidity ratios are crucial in any bankruptcy
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analysis o f the airline industry, especially as they relate to debt service obligations. For
example, in 2003, American Airlines was spending over 10 percent o f its revenue on debt
service obligations alone; thus, it was very close to filing bankruptcy.
The ATSB’s loan guarantees have helped provide assistance to US Airways, Frontier,
and America West so that those airlines could meet their current financial obligations.
United Airlines has been operating under bankruptcy protection since December 2002,
after the ATSB rejected its original application for $1.8 billion in guarantees (Maynard,
2004).

United has said it was likely to terminate its four employee pension plans. It has said
that it will not make required contributions while it is in bankruptcy. In short. United has
been unable to meet its current financial obligations. The threat has raised the ire of
U nited’s unions (Maynard, 2004). United may shed some or all o f its $13 billion in
pension obligations as the only way to succeed in emerging from bankruptcy
proceedings.

However, the federal agency that insures pensions is facing a possible

cascade o f bankruptcies and pension defaults in the airline industry. Some experts fear
that this could lead to a multi-billion dollar taxpayer bailout, similar to the savings and
loan industry collapse and subsequent taxpayer bailout o f the 1980’s.
Meanwhile, the entire industry almost certainly faces the prospect o f rising securityrelated costs above and beyond what it is already paying.

Congress set aside an

additional $100 million to compensate airlines for reinforcing airline cockpit doors.
However, the industry continues to face ongoing costs related to heightened security.
Airlines are now required either to screen all bags for explosives or to make sure each
bag on a plane is matched up to a passenger seated on that flight. This is both time-
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consuming and expensive.

Therefore, liquidity ratios should be included in any new

bankruptcy prediction model for the airline industry.

Solvency
Solvency ratios measure the degree o f debt financing used by a firm. These ratios
reveal the equity cushion that is available to absorb any operating losses. An airline is
solvent when its assets exceed its liabilities. High solvency ratios generally suggest that
an operation can weather financial storms. For example. Continental’s $5 billion in debt
is equal to half its total assets (Bonne, 2003). By comparison, the ratio of debt to equity
for the airline industry for the first quarter o f 2004 was 1.147 (Airline Overview, 2004).
Many airlines are carrying extremely high debt levels, at a time when investors are
increasingly worried about balance sheet stability after the collapse o f such companies as
Enron Corporation and MCI/WorldCom. For example. Delta ended the year 2002 with
total debt of $10.0 billion and a debt to equity ratio o f 92 percent, compared to 2001,
when it had total debt o f $9.4 billion and a debt to equity ratio o f 71 percent. Before its
bankruptcy filing in August 2002, US Airways Group’s debt to equity ratio was over 100
percent, indicating negative stockholders’ equity (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
A heavy debt burden contributes to the instability o f the airline industry. As a result
o f their increased leverage and the increased volatility o f earnings. People Express,
Eastern, and Pan American were unable to compete, following the passage o f the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 (Chow, Gritta, & Hockstein, 1988).

Airlines currently

operating with high leverage are similarly threatened.
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“The industry is burdened with a staggering load o f debt and unable to obtain
capital,” said Tony Velocci, editor-in-chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology, in
his presentation “Air Safety: At What Cost?” (Stein, 2004). The network carriers have
slashed capital spending in the past few years by about $8 billion (S&P’s CreditWeek,
2004). W ith the ability to save $40-$50 million upfront on a new 737 aircraft, it is not
surprising that leasing has allowed a handful o f low-fare carriers to quickly build new
fleets without assuming long-term debt burdens (Bonne, 2003).

“It gives you a

tremendous amount o f flexibility to manage through up and down markets,” says Bob
Genise, president and CEO o f Bouillioun Aviation Services. “Instead of making a 25year decision, you can take it on for five years.” The only downside, analysts warn, is
that leases have become a popular way for some carriers to hide debt off the balance
sheet.
Carriers, however, facing their toughest market in years, simply cannot afford the
lease payments as they exist in many o f the current contracts. If an airline goes bankrupt
or a lease is nearing the end o f its term, lessors may have to renegotiate the contract or
run the risk o f planes parked in the desert (Bruch, 2003). Thus, it is clear that financial
leverage (i.e., solvency) ratios should be incorporated in a bankruptcy prediction model
for airlines.

Cumulative Profitability over Time
The airlines’ current business model is under pressure, and it will have to change to
restore profitability (Bruch, 2003). From 2001 through the second quarter o f 2004, the
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industry will have lost more than $24 billion. When the business-travel boom ended in
2001, revenue plunged but costs remained high (Johnson, WSJ, 10/05/2004).
Low-cost airlines now account for 29 percent o f the domestic airline business, up
from 7 percent o f U.S. domestic air passengers in 1991. The rapid growth o f the market
share o f low-cost, low-fare carriers during the past few years is one o f the most
significant current trends in the industry, and is perceived as presenting a considerable
threat to the viability o f the network carriers.

The largest low-fare carriers currently

operating in the U.S. are Southwest, America West, AT A, JetBlue, AirTran, Spirit, and
Frontier. The response o f the network carriers to the growing low-fare challenge will be
critical to determining the future structure o f the U.S. airline industry (“The Airline
Industry,” 2003).
The network airlines, for their part, have acknowledged that their cost structure is too
high in comparison to low-cost carriers.

“Network” is used to describe airlines like

United, Northwest, Delta, US Airways, and Continental that operate extensive hub and
spoke systems (Jenkins, 2004). The big hubs are costly in terms o f real estate, staffing,
and flight delays (Carey, 2004).
Fuel expenses - the second largest financial drain on airlines’ operating budgets - are
apt to remain near historical highs for the foreseeable future. At the time o f this writing,
oil prices have reached an astronomical $50 per barrel. In just the past year, oil prices
have risen 75 percent. The network carriers in the past few years have done a remarkable
job o f reining in operating costs, which are down by $13.4 billion, but runaway fuel
prices have negated much o f those savings.
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With fuel at an all-time high, network airlines made over 12 attempts to boost airfares
in the first quarter o f 2004.

However, most o f these efforts have failed to stick.

Increasingly, the spoiler has been one or more low-fare airlines, which see a chance to
extend their market shares by not raising their prices. For travelers, this change in pricing
power could affect everything from ticket prices to the financial viability of the big
airlines tbey use, to whether they must continue to endure unpopular restrictions, such as
Saturday-night-stayover requirements, to get low fares (Carey, 2004).
Behind the price erosion is a weak economy; business travelers have moved to
cheaper, restricted tickets and the growth o f Southwest and its imitators. US Airways
said that 70 percent o f its domestic flying in 2003 was unprofitable. David Siegel, the
chief executive, said in a speech to employees, “If we could charge more money, we
would, but passengers want low fares” (Carey, 2004). Therefore, it seems evident that
cumulative firm profitability is an important factor to consider in an airline bankruptcy
model.

Productivity
The measure o f the produetivity o f an airline’s assets ean be obtained my dividing
earnings before interest and taxes by total assets.

Sinee a firm’s ultimate existence is

based on the earning power o f its assets, this ratio is particularly appropriate for studies
dealing with corporate failure. Furthermore, insolvency in a bankruptcy sense occurs
when the total liabilities exceed a fair valuation o f the firm’s assets with value determined
by the earning power o f the assets (Altman, 1968).
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The largest single expense item for all airlines is labor, over 40 percent of total costs
for some airlines (Baggaley, 2003).

In 2002, Southwest had costs per employee of

$59,100, according to industry consultant Vaughn Cordle. At the same time, the top five
network carriers averaged in payroll costs $95,500 per employee (Jenkins, 2004). The
network carriers also have senior work forces compensated at the top o f union scale
(Carey, 2004). To address these problems, the network carriers have sought substantial
wage and produetivity adjustments from their unions, with those that have filed for
bankruptey, or are teetering on the edge. They have generally won concessions from
them, with the exception o f US Airways, which filed for bankruptey a second time on
September 12, 2004 after failing to achieve desired wage concessions from their labor
unions. In addition, the major carriers have cut tens o f billions o f dollars in expenses,
have laid off over 110,000 employees, and have taken several hundred aircraft out of
service since September 2001, according to AT A President and CEO James May
(Maynard, 2004; Baggaley, 2003).
The difference in the cost structures between network airlines like United and lowfare carriers like Southwest reflect substantial differences in the productivity o f both
aircraft and employees. Low-fare carriers typically operate “point-to-point” networks in
which they can minimize aircraft ground times, in contrast to the hub-and-spoke
networks of most network airlines. Shorter ground times translate directly into higher
aircraft utilization rates (“The Airline Industry,” 2003). At the same time, Southwest’s
operating cost per available seat mile, for the quarter ended M arch 31, 2003, was 7.5
cents per available seat mile. United’s operating cost per available seat mile was 11.5
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cents, and US Airways was 12 cents.

These differences are dramatic in an industry

where cost control is o f paramount importance (Baggaley, 2003).
The Internet has had a profound effect on the way airlines price and distributing their
product. By selling tickets online, airlines have dramatically cut distribution costs. On
the other hand, the Internet has also led to more competitive pricing.

The Internet’s

appeal for airlines is apparent. A commercial Web site can be kept open for business 24
hours a day, seven days a week. Southwest Airlines reported in 2002 that their Internet
bookings cost them about one dollar to make, while their cost to book with a travel agent
is between $6 and $ 8 . Tickets booked through Southwest’s own agents cost several
dollars. On the down side, however, the Internet may ultimately hurt airline profitability
by making travelers too price-sensitive. It is very simple for the traveler to go online and
compare prices o f competitors. This makes it difficult for airlines to try to raise their
fares. Both business travelers, formerly high fare-paying, and budget travelers, can make
low-price flight arrangements on line (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003). Thus, a
bankruptcy prediction model for airlines should likely include a productivity measure.

Cash Flow
Cash flow relates to the actual cash generated and paid by the firm. Operating cash
flow is the net o f cash inflows relafed to revenues and cash outflows for operational cash
expenditures, including payments for salaries, wages, taxes, supplies, and interest on
debt. Operating cash flow is found in a firm’s SCF. The SCF helps people to asses a
firm’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations. The ratio o f operating cash
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flows to total liabilities should be relatively high; that is, the cash flow from operations
should be high relative to the firm’s total liabilities (Schmidgall, 2002).
Accounting income is not the relevant source of value in a firm. Cash flow is the
ultimate source o f value for the firm, since only cash can be spent to cover expenses
(Moyer, McGuigan & Kretlow, 2001). An airline needs sufficient cash on hand to cover
interest payments and other liquidity needs. D elta’s chief executive, Gerald A. Grinstein,
said, “We must not just have costs in line with our competitors, we must have cash flow.”
(Maynard, 2004).
Given the high debt levels carried by many airlines, and the frequency of large
operating losses due to industry cycles, it is important to look at operating cash flow to
assess the strength o f an airline to weather financial storms. During times o f industry
losses, it is important to determine how quickly an airline may be using its available cash,
its cash bum rate. In 2001 and 2002, for example, many airlines were burning though
millions o f dollars in cash each day. In such cases, it is important to gauge how long an
airline can withstand a downturn and remain solvent (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
With losses mounting following a sharp drop-off in travel in the months after
September 2001, most o f the carriers were forced to shoulder new debt, tapping their
credit lines and/or issuing bonds to respond to the rapid depletion o f their available cash.
These actions were vital to help the carriers survive, as passenger levels declined
dramatically, fares dropped, and losses increased sharply.
President Bush signed into law the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
Act on April 16, 2003, after fierce lobbying by the airline industry.

The airlines

contended that costs o f the war in Iraq and government-mandated security measures were
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harming the industry.

Under the Act, the Transportation Security Administration

(T.S.A.) disbursed pretax cash payments totaling $2.29 billion in May 2003.

These

payments were intended to reimburse the carriers for security fees they had paid to the
T.S.A. since February 2002. As a result o f the cash grants, most o f the top ten carriers
reported a profit in the second quarter o f 2003. However, after stripping out the cash
grants, most airlines would have reported sizable losses (Airlines Industry Survey, 2003).
For example, US Airways, in the second quarter o f 2003 (its first full quarter since
emerging from bankruptcy), reported profits o f $13 million, but this reported figure
included $216 million in government aid. If this grant were omitted, the company would
instead have lost $188 million for the quarter.
Without the grants, more o f the major carriers might have been forced to file for
bankruptcy protection, and United and US Airways would have filed sooner. In some
cases, the direct cash grants may have only served to delay the inevitable bankruptcy
filing. Thus, it seems clear that a bankruptcy model for airlines should include a cash
flow measure.

Next, this chapter concludes with a brief commentary on the future

outlook for the airline industry.

Future Outlook
What will likely emerge in the airline industry over time is a domestic market with
several large, low-cost/low-fare airlines and several large, hub-and-spoke airlines (or
perhaps several alliances o f such carriers) competing for passengers. Such an outcome
implies ongoing costs pressures on the network carriers, but not their total extinction
(Baggaley, 2003). In any case, it seems evident that the industry is at a turning point - it
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could well be on the brink of a major industry restructuring that includes the bankruptcy,
liquidation, and/or consolidation o f several major network carriers (“The Airline
Industry,” 2003). Thus, the development o f a new bankruptcy prediction model for the
airline industry might be very timely and useful. If the model can truly be predictive in
nature, it could provide guidance for the many parties who are interested in the industry’s
survival.

Summary
This chapter developed the theoretical background for testing Altman’s Z”-score
model on airlines, and for creating a new bankruptcy prediction model. The next chapter
discusses the proposed methodology for utilizing multiple discriminate analysis in this
dissertation, and for performing the remainder o f the research that is proposed in this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The primary purpose o f this dissertation was to test an existing bankruptcy prediction
model, the Altman Z”-score model (Z”-score model) on airline firms, using financial
ratios for the period 1998-2003. A second objective o f this study was to develop a new
bankruptcy prediction model, using airline financial ratios derived from the financial
statements for years 1998-2003.

A new bankruptcy prediction model needed to

differentiate between airlines that were likely to go bankrupt and those that were not
likely to go bankrupt. For it to be effective, this new model needed to predict bankruptcy
more accurately than the Z”-score model. The new model also required either a higher
classification rate, or needed to predict bankruptcy earlier, than the existing Z”-score
model.
A possible outcome o f this study was that a new model did not predict bankruptcy
more accurately than the Z”-score model.

The Z”-score model might have offered a

superior classification rate, and may have been able to predict bankruptcy earlier than the
new model. If so, then this dissertation will have provided further support for the use of
the existing Z”-score model.
This chapter discusses the methodology that will be used to test the models described
above. It begins with a discussion o f the research design, including the selection o f firms
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used in the sample.

It continues by explaining the principal methodology employed

herein to test the bankruptcy prediction models, which is Multiple Discriminant Analysis
(MDA), and identifies the major issues involved in the application o f MDA. Finally, the
chapter concludes with a discussion on how to validate the results o f MDA.

Research Design
Altman (1993) states that, ideally, one would like to develop a bankruptcy prediction
model utilizing a homogeneous group o f bankrupt companies and data as near to the
present as possible.
guidelines.

This dissertation seeks to do that, consistent with Altman’s

The analyses in this study used bankrupt and non-bankrupt airline firms’

1998-2003 financial statements.

The financial statements were retrieved from the

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) website, www.sec.gov. using the EDGAR
database, and from airline firms’ annual reports which were available on-line from the
individual companies’ websites. All publicly held U.S. companies are required to file
their financial statements with the SEC.
Bankrupt companies, for the purposes o f this study, were defined as those meeting
one o f the following conditions: (1) in Chapter 11 bankruptcy; or, (2) in Chapter 7
liquidation. Thus, those airline firms that were in one or more o f these states at any time
during the 1998-2004 time period were considered to be bankrupt.

Selection o f Firms
Only publicly held airlines were selected for this study, as the financial reports of
these firms are readily available. Privately held companies are not required to make their
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financial statements available to the public. Their financial reports are more difficult to
obtain; therefore, they were not included in this dissertation. This study used a census
approach, rather than random sample.

Major and National Airline Carriers
Only major and national airlines were selected for this study.

Major airlines, or

majors, are a group o f large, certified air carriers that have annual operating revenues
over $ 1 billion. National airlines, or nationals, are a group o f large, certified air carriers
that have annual operating revenues o f $100 million to $1 billion.
The major passenger airlines include Alaska, America West, American, Continental,
Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, United, and US Air. They are all publicly owned and
were included in this study.

Air Canada was also included in this study, as it has

sufficiently large revenues, and uses Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
in preparing its financial statements, like publicly owned U.S. firms. Also, Air Canada
stock is sold on the American Stock Exchange. Non-passenger airlines (DHL, Federal
Express, and United Parcel Service) were not included in this study. Publicly owned
national passenger airlines included in this study were AirTran (formerly Valu Jet), AT A
(formerly Amtran), Frontier, Hawaiian, and JetBlue.

Network and Low-Cost Carriers
The Bureau o f Transportation Statistics [BTS] (2004) listed the following airlines as
network carriers in 2004: Alaska; American; Continental; Delta; Northwest; United; and
US Airways. All o f these carriers were included in this study. Trans World Airlines
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(TWA), which flew its last official flight December 1, 2001, was also a network carrier.
As TWA was still operating during part o f the 1998-2004 time period, was also included
in this study.
The BTS (2004) listed the following as low-cost carriers: AirTran; ATA; America
West; Frontier; JetBlue; Southwest; and Spirit. Spirit Airlines is not publicly owned and
its financial statements are difficult to obtain. Thus, it was not included in this study. The
other low-cost carriers were included herein.

Therefore, this dissertation included

financial data from a total o f 16 airline firms over a 6-year period.

Time Frame o f the Study
The time frame selected for this study was the period 1998-2004. It was during this
period that the airline industry had seen its most turbulent times in its history. In 1998,
air carriers were earning record profits. However, since 2000, a soft economy, increased
competition, and rising fuel and labor costs and increased security costs cut into airline
profits. By 2002, only 2 o f the major carriers. Southwest and JetBlue, earned a profit.
Most o f the largest carriers in the United States (US) suffered their third consecutive year
of heavy losses in 2003.

As o f 2004, US airline industry had accumulated over $30

billion in losses since 2000 (McCartney, 2004).
As discussed in Chapter 2, US airlines found themselves in a struggle on several
fronts. The airlines now face a true challenge from low-cost entrants who have molded a
completely different, and profitable, way o f doing business; further, they are not upstarts,
but well-established and successful companies (Bonne, 2003). The airline industry has
been changing rapidly. Six publicly owned US major and national airlines went bankrupt
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during the time period of 1998-2004, as will be discussed in this chapter. At the time of
this writing, 2004 financial statements were not yet publicly available. Therefore, the
1998-2003 period seemed to be an appropriate one to use for testing the Z”-score model,
which is a model developed specifically for the prediction o f non-manufacturing
corporate bankruptcies. In this dissertation, the same airline firms’ data set was used to
formulate a revised model. This new model was also tested to determine its ability to
predict airline firm bankruptcy. Altman (1993) stated that a bankruptcy prediction model
should use a homogeneous group o f bankrupt companies and data as near to the present
time as possible. This dissertation did that, consistent with Altman’s guidelines.

Sample Selection and Size
During the period 1998-2004, the following six airline firms were liquidated or filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy: Air Canada; ATA; Hawaiian; TWA; United; and, US Air. O f
these firms, four are majors, and two are nationals. One o f these six firms is a low-cost
carrier. During the same time period, the following ten firms were not liquidated, nor did
they file for Chapter II bankruptcy: Air Tran; Alaska; America West; American;
Continental; Delta; Frontier; JetBlue; Northwest; and. Southwest.
seven are majors, and four are nationals.

O f these II firms,

Five o f these ten firms are also low-cost

carriers.
In the period o f this study, the above sixteen firms would have filed a total o f 96
annual reports, which would have resulted in 96 individual observations.

However,

TWA stopped operating in December 2001, so there are fewer than three years of
available financial data for TWA. Also, JetBlue did not become a publicly traded entity
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until 2002, but three years o f financial data are available for 2001 through 2003.
Additionally, Air Canada’s 1998 financial reports are not publicly available. Therefore, a
total o f 90 observations were available as the data set for this study.
This sample size was adequate, given the statistical method chosen. MDA is quite
sensitive to the ratio of sample size to the number o f predictor variables.

Hair et al.

(1998) state that many studies suggest a ratio o f 20 observations for each predictor
variable. Altman’s (1993) model uses only four variables, which would have required at
least 80 observations, so that ratio is achieved. Further, the specified 20 to one ratio
could be nearly achieved for a new five-variable model, and would only fall ten
observations short o f the desired total o f 100 in this case.

Also, at a minimum, the

sample size o f the smaller group should exceed the number o f predictor variables
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The sample size o f the smaller group was 33, which greatly
exceeded the number of variables to be used in either the Altman (1993) model, or the
new model.

Therefore, the sample size and the group size were both adequate for

purposes of this dissertation.

The sample size o f the larger group was 57. Multiple

discriminant analysis is a one-way analysis and no special problems are posed by unequal
sample sizes in groups. In the next section, assumptions o f MDA are covered.

Assumptions o f Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Hair et al. (1998) state that it is desirable to meet certain conditions for proper
application o f MDA.

The key assumptions for deriving the discriminant function are

multivariate normality o f the independent variable and equal covariances.

MDA is

relatively robust to failures o f normality, if skewness rather than outliers causes the
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violation. Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) state that robustness is expected with 20 cases in
the smallest group if there are only five or fewer predictors. Therefore, in this case, with
27 cases in the smallest group and five or fewer predictors, robustness to any failures in
normality o f the residuals should be expected.
However, MDA is highly sensitive to outliers. Therefore, a test for outliers in the
data set for each group was run.

To check for outliers, Mahalanobis’ distance was

computed. Any outliers were then examined individually. Outliers were not expected
among the financial ratio values.
MDA assumes linear relationships among all pairs o f predictors within each group.
Where a curvilinear relationship exists, it may be corrected by transforming some o f the
predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Unequal covariance matrices can have an adverse affect on the classification process.
This effect can be minimized by using an adequate sample size (Hair et al., 1998). A
Levene test determines whether the variances are approximately equal.
Multicollinearity can be expected among the variables, as the all of the financial
ratios come from the same source, financial statements.

This analysis did not use a

stepwise procedure, but a simultaneous variable entry, to examine the power of all o f the
variables altogether (Hair et ah, 1998).
In classification, a decision was required as to whether one wants the a priori
probabilities o f assignment to groups to be influenced by sample size (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001). It was decided that the probability with which a case is assigned to a group
should reflect the sample sizes o f the two groups. The larger group, the non-bankrupt
group, included ten firms. The smaller group, the bankrupt group, included six firms.
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Therefore, a naïve prediction o f the probability o f airline bankruptcy was six out of
sixteen, or 37.5 percent.

Statistical Methodology
An appropriate statistical technique was selected in order to analyze the financial
ratios and develop the differentiation model required for bankruptcy prediction. In order
to select an appropriate method, the model assumptions were examined, relative to the
information to be analyzed. MDA is the quantitative method that was selected for the
purposes o f this dissertation.

MDA is a sophisticated quantitative method of data

analysis that predicts group membership (e.g., bankrupt or non-bankrupt) from a set of
predictors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In this dissertation, the predictors were a set of
financial ratios that measured a firm ’s liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity,
solvency, and cash flow. Using MDA, the airlines included in this study were classified
into either one o f two groups, bankrupt or non-bankrupt.

A significant difference

between the two groups, bankrupt or non-bankrupt, implies that one can predict whether
a firm will be bankrupt in one, two, or even three years, depending upon the score that the
firm receives from the application o f MDA. Thus, the primary statistical problem in this
research was one o f classifying an individual business as a member o f one o f two classes,
bankrupt or non-bankrupt, based upon the ratio variables that were identified as being key
to their ultimate success. As in the studies cited in Chapter 2, M DA is used to form a
linear model that classifies individual firms based on their historical financial ratios.
MDA is principally used to classify and to make predictions in situations where the
criterion variable is in categorical form, as was the case in this study (e.g., bankrupt
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versus non-bankrupt). A categorical variable is one that uses values that serve as a label
or means o f identification (Hair et ah, 1998).
dissertation was SPSS-Version 12.0.

The statistical software used in this

SPSS offers statistics including: W ilks’ Lambda

(only variables that are well below 1.0 reflect an ability to discriminate); statistical
significance of each discriminator; and, univariate F-ratio for each predictor or financial
ratio (Meidan & Chiu, 1995). This information is important in identifying which ratios
do the best job o f differentiating between a bankrupt airline company and a non-bankrupt
airline firm.
To validate the model, a split (sometimes called “hold-out) sample approach is
suggested when there are at least 100 in the total sample (Hair et ah, 1998). However,
according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), jackknifed (or “leave one out”) classification
gives a more realistic estimate o f the ability o f the predictors to separate groups. In
jackknifed classification, the data from the firm are left out when the coefficients used to
assign it to a group are computed. This study adopted the approach recommended by
Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) and uses jackknifed classification for the analysis.
Either a simultaneous or sequential computational approach can be used to derive a
discriminant function (Hair et al, 1998). The simultaneous approach was utilized on the
four variables used in the Altman Z”-score model and on the new model.
After the new discriminant function for the new model has been computed, a t-test
was performed.

This determined whether the two groups’ scores were significantly

different
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Computation of Ratios
All three o f the major financial statements were used in this study; namely, the
balance sheet, the income statement, and the statement o f cash flows. The balance sheet
is a major financial statement that is prepared at the end o f each accounting period. The
relevant period o f time, for purposes o f this study, was one year.

The balance sheet

reflects the financial position o f the firm— its assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity— at a
given date (Schmidgall, 2002).
The income statement reports the success o f the firm’s operations for period of time.
In this study, the relevant period o f time was one year. The income statement shows the
amount o f revenues that the firm earned and the amount o f expenses that were incurred in
earning those revenues (Schmidgall, 2002).
The statement o f cash flows shows the effects on cash o f a business’s operating,
investing, and financing activities for the period.

The relevant period o f time, in this

study, was one year. The statement o f cash flows explains the change in cash from the
beginning o f the year to the end o f the year (Schmidgall, 2002).
The liquidity ratio used in the Z”-score model was working capital divided by total
assets.

Working capital is defined as current assets minus current liabilities.

This

information can be obtained from each firm’s balance sheet. Cumulative profitability, in
Altman’s (1993) model, was defined as retained earnings divided by total assets. This
information can also be obtained from each firm ’s balance sheet.
The productivity ratio used in Altman’s model (1993) was earnings before interest
and taxes, divided by total assets. This ratio is also known as gross return on assets. The
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earnings information is found on each firm’s income statements, and the total assets
figure is found on each firm’s balance sheet.
The solvency ratio used by Altman was net worth, or owners’ equity, divided by total
liabilities. This is the same as the inverse o f the traditional debt-to-equity ratio. These
figures are found on each firm’s balance sheet.
Lastly, cash flow ratios can be included in a new bankruptcy prediction model.
Beaver (1967), Deakin (1972), and Blum found that the ratio o f cash flow to total debt
was significant in predicting bankruptcy. Cash flow from operations data can be obtained
from each firm ’s statement of cash flows. The net cash flow from operating activities
figure, for each firm, for each year, was used. Total firm debt is found on the balance
sheet.

Analysis o f Results
Once the variables (financial ratios) were identified, as discussed above, the ratios for
the Z”-score model and the new model were computed. Applying the formula(s) for each
model to the ratios yielded the appropriate score, or Z”-score, for each firm.
The Z”-score model produces one score for each company for each year. In Altman’s
1993 study, he determined that firms with a score o f less 1.10 were failed and that firms
with a score o f greater than 2.60 were not failed. Scores between 1.10 and 2.60 were not
consistently failed or non-failed and required further investigation. These same cutoff
values were used to accomplish the initial classification under the new model in this
study.
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The firms were first grouped into two groups, either bankrupt or non-bankrupt,
according to their actual status. The Z”-scores were then computed. Using the computed
Z ”-scores, each firm within each group was then put into a second group that indicated
one o f three possible results of the test: bankrupt, non-bankrupt, or unclassified (the grey
area). The results were then presented in a “prediction accuracy matrix” format adapted
from the classification matrix format used by Altman (1993) to evaluate his study. One
must construct classification matrices to determine the predictive ability of a discriminant
function.
An analysis o f the predictive ability o f the model was then completed; that is, an
assessment was made as to whether the model correctly predicted the firm’s status, failed
to predict the firm ’s status, or was unable to predict the firm’s status.

The model’s

accuracy was determined based on the percentage o f the firms that were correctly
classified into these categories.

Therefore, there were three separate measures for

accuracy: the percentage o f bankrupt firms classified as bankrupt; the percentage o f non
bankrupt firms classified as non-bankrupt, and the percentage o f all the firms that were
properly classified. These results are reported in Chapter 4 of this study.
The frequency of non-classification also impacts the utility o f the model.

If the

model is unable to predict bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy, further analysis is required.
While additional analysis is always appropriate before making decisions, the model does
not add any value to the analysis if it does not produce a classification (Patterson, 2001).
For each model involved in this dissertation (i.e., the Z”-score model, and the Kroeze
model), a prediction accuracy matrix was created showing the number and percentage of
correct classifications and incorrect classifications. An example o f an accuracy matrix is
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shown in Table 4 (Altman, 1993). For example, in the first row, one can see that 33 firms
are actually bankrupt.

The model correctly classified 30 o f the firms as bankrupt.

Therefore, the model was correct in predicting bankruptcy 90.9 percent o f the time. The
model was also correct in predicting non-bankruptcy 97 percent o f the time.

Table 4
Prediction Accuracy Matrix

Classified
Non-bankrupt

Total

Actual

Bankrupt

Bankrupt

30(90dM4]

3 (9.1%)

33

Non-bankrupt

1 (3.0%)

32 (97.0%;

33

Total

31 (100%)

35 (100%)

66

Source: Altman, 1993

Since this study used six bankrupt and ten non-bankrupt firms, a simple random
classification o f a firm as bankrupt or would be accurate six-sixteenths or 37.5 percent of
the time. This type o f classification is called a naïve selection, and the added utility of
the models being evaluated was determined by how much better they predict bankruptcy
or non-bankruptcy than a naïve prediction. This was determined by performing a chisquare test on the classification matrix.
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Once the accuracy of each model was determined, the overall results o f each model
were compared to determine which model was the better predictor o f bankruptcy in the
airline industry. The results o f each model were also evaluated against a naïve model
The new model, or Kroeze model, was considered to be better than the Altman Z”score model if it correctly predicted airline firm bankruptcy by at least one firm more
than the Altman Z”-score model. For example, given that five airline firms have gone
bankrupt, if the Altman Z”-score model correctly predicted which three airline firms will
go bankrupt three years before the event, the Kroeze model needed to correctly predict
which four airlines would go bankrupt, three years before the event.
Thus, H I was tested by performing a chi-square test on the classification matrix that
compared the Altman Z”-score to a naïve model. H2 was tested by performing a chisquare test on the classification matrix that compared the Altman Z”-score model to the
Kroeze model. The hypotheses are reviewed below.

Restatement o f Research Hypotheses

The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are as follows:
Hlo: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
HI*: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2q: a revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”score model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
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H2 a: a revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-score
model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.

The Altman Z”-score model (1993) is shown below in Table 5.

Table 5
Altman Z ”-Score Model

Z" = 6.56 X, + 3.26 X; + 6.72 X 3 + 1.0 5 X 4 + A
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X 2 = retained eamings/total assets;
X 3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets;
X4

= book value o f equity/book value o f total liabilities;

s = error term; and,
Z” = overall index.

Reliability and Validity Issues
Reliability and validity were not directly at issue in this dissertation. Reliability
involves the extent to which the set o f variables is consistent in what the set is intended to
measure (Hair et al., 1998). Validity encompasses the idea o f how well the concept is
defined by the measures (Hair et al., 1998). This study did not collect primary data by
means o f a survey instrument; instead, it used secondary data from public sources to test
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the models that were under scrutiny herein. Thus, reliability and validity were not major
issues that have to be considered during the conduct o f this study.

Summary
This chapter presented the research methodology that is involved in this dissertation.
The research process involved in testing a bankruptcy prediction model was discussed.
Next, issues relating to sample selection and sample size were discussed.

This was

followed by a discussion o f the methodology to be used in the study (MDA). Finally, the
methods for conducting statistical analyses on the data were addressed. The results of the
application o f these methods are discussed in the succeeding chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter discusses the results o f the analysis and the hypothesis testing for the
data that were collected as discussed in Chapter 3.

The first section o f the chapter

examines the issues o f prediction accuracy o f the models that were tested in this
dissertation.

The next section uses chi-square analysis to test the models’ predictive

ability. The last section discusses testing o f the data set that was used in this study,
including the treatment o f unequal sample sizes and missing data, and an examination of
possible normality, outlier variables, linearity, variance, and collinearity issues.

Prediction Accuracy
There were six bankrupt firms and ten non-bankrupt firms. The bankrupt firms were
coded one. The non-bankrupt firms were coded two. There were a total of 90 cases used
to calculate a discriminant function. The 90 cases were obtained from 1998 through 2003
financial reports, include five Air Canada cases (1999 through 2003), six Hawaiian Air
cases (1998 through 2003), four TWA cases (1998 through 2001), six US Airways cases
(1998 through 2003), six United cases (1998 through 2003), six America West cases
(1998through 2003), six Frontier cases (1998 through 2003), six Alaska cases (1998
through 2003), six American cases (1998 through 2003), six Continental cases
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(1998 through 2003), six Northwest cases (1998 through 2003), six Southwest cases
(1998 through 2003), three JetBlue cases (1998 through 2003), six Delta cases (1998
through 2003), six ATA cases (1998 through 2003), and six Air Tran cases (1998 through
2003).
Consistent with the methodology described in Chapter 3, Altman Z”-Score model (Z”
Model) scores were calculated. The discriminant function for the Z” model was used to
calculate a Z” score for each case. For example. Air Canada’s Z” scores were -5.22 in
2003, -2.62 in 2002, -2.16 in 2001, -1.04 in 2000, and -.06 in 1999.
The airlines used in this study were then classified as bankrupt, non-bankrupt, or in
the grey area, according to the Z” Model and using the appropriate cutoff values that
were suggested by prior research, as discussed in Chapter 2. The cutoffs were; less than
1 . 1, classified as bankrupt; greater than 2 .6 , classified as non-bankrupt; and between 1.1

and 2.6, in the grey area.

Air Canada filed for bankruptcy in 2003.

Therefore, Air

Canada would have been correctly classified as bankrupt in 2002, one year ahead o f the
event; in 2 0 0 1 , two years ahead o f the event; in 2 0 0 0 , three years ahead of the event; and
in 1999, four years ahead of the event.

There were a total o f 23 cases for which a

classification could be made one year, two years, three years, and four years ahead of a
bankruptcy filing. Therefore, four o f the 23 cases corresponded to Air Canada.
There were a total o f 39 cases from firms that did not file for bankruptcy. Southwest,
for example, had Z” scores greater than 2.6 for every year in this study.

Therefore,

Southwest would have been correctly classified as non-bankrupt in 2003 (one year before
the most recent financial period), 2002 (two years before the most recent financial period)
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2001 (three years before the most recent financial period), and 2000 (four years before

the most recent financial period). Four o f the 39 cases corresponded to Southwest.
The table below (Table 6 lists the airlines, the financial statement dates (years
inclusive) used for calculating the financial ratios and classification scores, and the
number o f cases that each airline contributed. There were a total o f 62 cases.
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Table 6
Airlines, Financial Statement Dates, and Cases

Airline

Financial Statement Dates

Number i

ATA

2000 to 2003

4

Air Canada

1999 to 2002

4

Air Tran

2000 to 2003

4

America West

2000 to 2003

4

American

2000 to 2003

4

Alaska

2000 to 2003

4

Continental

2000 to 2003

4

Delta

2000 to 2003

4

Frontier

2000 to 2003

4

Hawaiian

1999 to 2002

4

JetBlue

2001 to 2003

3

Northwest

2000 to 2003

4

Southwest

2000 to 2003

4

TWA

1998 to 2000

3

US Airways

1998 to 2001

4

United

1998 to 2001

4

Table 7 (and the subsequent tables 8 through 11) is interpreted by reading across each
row. For example, in Table 7 the number o f airline firms that were actually bankrupt and
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the model correctly predicted their bankrupt status was 23. There were a total of 23 cases
of actual bankruptcy.
correctly predicted.

Therefore, 23 correct out o f a total o f 23 equals 100 percent
However, only 7 firms that were actually non-bankrupt were

correctly classified as non-bankrupt. There were a total o f 39 cases o f non-bankruptcy.
Therefore, 7 correct out of a total o f 39 equals 17.9 percent correctly predicted. Overall
accuracy is calculated by adding the number o f correctly classified firms, 7 plus 23, and
dividing that by the total number o f cases, 23 plus 39. Overall accuracy, then, was 30
divided by 62, or 48.4 percent.

Table 7
Altman Z " S c o re Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix

Classified
Actual

Bankrupt

Non-bankrupt

Bankrupt

23

0

0

( 100 %)

(0 %)

( 0 %)

26

7

(66.7%)
Total

Non-bankrupt Grey Area

Total

6

(17.9%)

49

7

( 100 %)

( 100 %)

23

39

(15.4%)
6

( 100 %)

Source: Altman, 1993
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The Z ” -score model, as shown in Table 7, had no errors in classifying the bankrupt
firms. All o f the bankrupt firms were correctly classified by the Z” model as bankrupt.
However, there were serious errors among the non-bankrupt firms using this model.
Only 17.9 percent o f the non-bankrupt firms were correctly classified as non-bankrupt.
Furthermore, 15.4 percent of the cases fell into the grey area and could not be classified
without further analysis. Thus, these cases represent serious flaws in using the Z” model
to predict bankruptcy.
A naïve approach would predict that 37.1 percent (23/62) o f the cases should be
classified as bankrupt. This is quite close to a naïve prediction o f 37.5 percent, which is
calculated by dividing 6 , the number o f bankrupt firms, by the total number o f firms, 16.
Thus, the Altman Z”-score model (Z” model), although it appears to be superior to a
naïve prediction, is not very accurate at predicting airline corporate bankruptcy for the
years 1998-2004.
Next, Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) was performed using the same four
financial ratios as predictors o f bankruptcy. MDA was performed using SPSS 12.0; all
four predictors were simultaneously forced into the equation.

The predictor variables

used were Xi, X%, X 3, and X4, as in the Z” model. The results o f MDA were statistically
significant, and the classification accuracy was considerably higher than that o f the Z”
model.

However, the coefficient for variable X 3 was a negative, indicating that

collinearity was likely present in the data set among one or more o f the predictor
variables.

Therefore, a new MDA analysis was run, in which the X 3 variable was

eliminated. This equation had nearly identical classification accuracy and scoring as the
four variable model, without any multicollinearity issues; thus, it was deemed to be
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superior to the four variable model. New variable coefficients and a new cutoff were
then established, compared to the Z” model, which created a new discriminant function
equation. Using this equation, overall prediction accuracy o f the new three variable
model (the Kroeze model) was found to be 45/62, or 72.6 percent, which represents a
dramatic improvement in prediction accuracy (Table 8 ).

Table 8
Kroeze Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix

Classified
Actual
Bankrupt

Bankrupt
18

(783%0
Non-bankrupt

12

(30.8%)
Total

Non-bankrunt
5

Total
23

(21.7%)
27

39

(69.2%)

30

32

( 100 %)

( 100 %)

62

Adapted from Altman, 1993

As shown above, 78.3 percent o f bankrupt airline firms were correctly classified as
bankrupt using the Kroeze model.

Further, 69.2 percent o f non-bankrupt firms were

correctly classified as non-bankrupt. This result represented a considerable improvement
over the Z” model. The Z” model uses a grey area, where firms with Z” scores between
1.1 and 2.6 are not classified. The Kroeze model is simpler. It does not use a grey area;
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instead, it classifies firms as either bankrupt, or non-bankrupt.
score are classified as non-bankrupt.

Firms with a positive

Firms with a negative score are classified as

bankrupt.
Finally, a second MDA was performed, this time using a fifth predictor variable (X 5).
X 5 represented cash flow, which is net cash flow from operations divided by total
liabilities. X 5 was added to the Z” model, and to the Kroeze model. Although the MDA
results were statistically significant, the addition o f a new variable did not improve the
classification accuracy o f the models. In fact, the cash flow ratio reduced the models’
accuracy. Therefore, consistent with the objective o f parsimony in academic research
(Hair et al., 1998), fewer is better. The Kroeze model is preferable to the four and five
variable models.

Therefore, the models that included the cash flow variable were

discarded for the remainder o f this study.
When one compares the Z” model and the Kroeze model year by year, it is apparent
that the Kroeze model outperformed the Z” model. First, the initial sample o f sixteen
airline firms, six bankrupt and ten non-bankrupt firms, was examined using data one
financial statement prior to bankruptcy. The two models’ prediction accuracy matrices,
one year prior to bankruptcy, are displayed below (Table 9). The Z” model predicted
only half of the airline firms’ status correctly one year before a bankruptcy filing. The
model classified only 50 percent o f the sample correctly; that is, eight out o f sixteen
firms.

The Kroeze model correctly classified thirteen out o f sixteen airline firms for

81.25 percent accuracy. This result represented a considerable improvement over the Z”
model’s predictive accuracy. Therefore, the Kroeze model was more accurate than the
Z” model one financial statement prior to bankruptcy.
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Table 9
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, One Year Prior to Bankruptcy

Z” Model. Classified

Actual

Kroeze Model, Classified

NonGrey
Bankrupt Bankrupt Area

NonBankrupt Bankrupt

Total

Bankrupt

6

0

0

5

1

6

NonBankrupt

7

2

1

3

7

10

Adapted from Altman, 1993

A second test was made to observe the discriminating ability o f the models, using
data from financial statements produced two years prior to bankruptcy. This test showed
that the Z” model had a 43.75 percent correct assignment rate; that is, seven out of
sixteen firms were correctly classified.

A test was also performed to observe the

discriminating ability o f the new model using data from two years prior to bankruptcy.
The results are shown in Table 10. The reduction in the accuracy o f group classification
is understandable as bankruptcy was more remote. Nonetheless, 68.75 percent correct
assignment (that is, 11/16) is evidence that airline bankruptcy can be predicted two years
prior to its actual occurrence by the Kroeze model.
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Table 10
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Two Years Prior to Bankruptcy

Z” M odel Classified

Actual

Kroeze Model. Classified

NonGrey
Bankrupt Bankrupt Area

NonBankrupt Bankrupt

Total

Bankrupt

6

0

0

5

1

6

NonBankrupt

7

1

2

4

6

10

Adapted from Altman, 1993

A third test was made to observe the discriminating ability o f the model, using data
from financial statements released three years prior to bankruptcy (Table 11). The Z”
model classified firms correctly for 50 percent o f the sample; that is, for eight out of
sixteen firms.

Although this rate is slightly higher than the accuracy rate for a later

period, one should not conclude that the Z” model improved with increased time. A third
test was also made to assess the accuracy the Kroeze model in predicting bankruptcy
three years prior to the event.

Again, the new model produced 68.75 percent

classification accuracy (11/16). This is evidence that airline bankruptcy can be predicted
three years prior to the event using the Kroeze model.
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Table 11

Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Three Years Prior to Bankruptcy

Kroeze Model. Classified

Z” Model. Classified

Actual

NonGrey
Bankrupt Bankrupt Area

NonBankrupt Bankrupt

Total

Bankrupt

6

0

0

4

2

6

NonBankrupt

7

2

1

3

7

10

Adapted from Altman, 1993

Finally, a fourth test was made, using financial statements produced four years prior
to bankruptcy (Table 12). The Z” model correctly assigned seven out of fourteen firms,
for 50 percent accuracy.

The classification accuracy for the Kroeze model was 71.4

percent; that is, ten out o f fourteen airline firms were correctly classified. This matrix
excluded two firms that would have required the use o f 1997 financial statements, which
is beyond the time range used in this study. However, it is apparent that the Kroeze
model can be used to predict airline bankruptcy up to four years prior to the actual event.
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Table 12
Prediction Accuracy Matrix, Four Years Prior to Bankruptcy

Z” Model, Classified

Actual

Kroeze Model, Classified

NonGrey
Bankrupt Bankrupt Area

NonBankrupt Bankrupt

Total

Bankrupt

5

0

0

3

2

5

NonBankrupt

5

2

2

2

7

9

Adapted from Altman, 1993

In summary, the results of comparing the models showed that for each of the four
years before a bankruptcy filing, the Kroeze model consistently outperformed the Z”
model in terms of prediction accuracy. Second, the Kroeze model used fewer variables in
striving for parsimony. Third, the single cut-off o f zero made classification very simple.
Therefore, the Kroeze model is preferable to the Z” model in predicting airline firm
bankruptcy up to four years before the event. Next, the two models were tested for
statistical significance.

Chi Square Analysis and Hypothesis Testing
To test hypotheses about data that use counts, one computes a chi-square statistic and
compares its value to the chi-square distribution to see how unlikely the observed value is
if the null hypothesis is true (Norusis, 2001). The assumptions needed to use the chisquare test are: 1) the categories o f a variable don’t overlap, 2 ) most of the expected
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counts must be greater than five; and, 3) none o f the expected counts can be less than
one. These assumptions have been met.
A total o f 62 cases were classified above. The same 62 cases will be used to test the
hypotheses.
The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are as follows;
H I q: There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H I a: There is a relationship between the Altman Z”-score model and the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2o: A revised bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”score model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H2 a: a revised bankruptcy prediction model is better than the Altman Z”-score
model in predicting the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.
First, the Z” model was tested to determine if it classified better than a naïve
prediction. Hypothesis Hl o states that there is no relationship between the Altman Z”Score model and the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm. As shown in Table 13,
the critical chi-square value o f 7.87944 (p=.005, d f 1) was not met. The Z” model failed,
and hypothesis H l o is not rejected. There is no relationship between the Altman Z”-Score
and the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm. Hypothesis H I a is rejected.
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Table 13
Chi-Square Analysis, Z ” Model

Correct

Not Correct

Total

Count

30

32

62

Expected Count

23

39

62

(30-23)^/23 + (32-39)^/39 - 3.86

Next, the Kroeze model was tested.

The second hypothesis states that a revised

bankruptcy prediction model is no better than the Altman Z”-Seore model in predicting
the likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.

Therefore, the Kroeze model was

compared to the Z” model. As shown in Table 14, the critical value o f 7.87944 was
reached (p=.005, d f 1). Therefore, Hypothesis H2 q is rejected, and Hypothesis H2 a is
accepted. The Kroeze model is better than the Altman Z”-Score modelin predicting the
likelihood o f bankruptcy for an airline firm.

Table 14
Chi-Square Analysis, Kroeze Model versus Z ” Model

______ Correct

Not Correct

Total

Count

45

17

62

Z” Count

30

32

62

(45-30)^/30 + (17-32)^/32 = 14.53
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The Kroeze model is also better than a naïve prediction model in predicting airline
firm bankruptcy. See Table 15. The critical value o f 7.87944 was reached (p=.005, df 1).

Table 15
Chi-Square Analysis, Kroeze Model versus Naïve Prediction

Correct

Not Correct

Total

Count

45

17

62

Expected Count

23

39

62

(45-23)^/23 + (17-39)^/39 = 33.45

The Kroeze model is shown in Table 16. The cutoff for this model is 0.0. Therefore,
a firm with a negative K score is classified as bankrupt. A firm with a positive K score is
classified as non-bankrupt.
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Table 16
Kroeze M odel

K - .268Xi + .838X2 +. 11 1X 3 + é
Where:
X] = working capital/total assets;
X 2 = retained earnings/total assets;
X3

= book value o f equity/total liabilities;

s = error term; and,
K = overall index.

Findings
The Kroeze model calculates a score which, if negative, indicates a classification of
bankruptcy. If the score is positive, a classification o f non-bankruptcy is indicated.
In the Kroeze model, the most important predictor o f bankruptcy is the variable that
represents retained earnings divided by total assets. It makes intuitive sense that negative
retained earnings would spell financial distress for an airline. A firm can not sustain net
losses for an extended amount o f time without failing.
The Kroeze model predicted that Air Canada, Hawaiian, and US Airways would go
bankrupt four years before the actual occurrence o f their bankruptcies.

The Kroeze

model predicted that TWA would go bankrupt three years before it did. It also predicted
that AT A would go bankrupt two years prior to the actual event, and that United would
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go bankrupt one year prior to its actual bankruptcy filing. This situation constitutes good
prediction accuracy up to four years before tbe actual event occurs.
See Figures 1 through 16 below for each airline’s K-score graph. Graphs of the six
major or national airlines that filed for bankruptcy between 1998 and 2004 are shown
first, followed by graphs of the ten major or national airlines that did not file for
bankruptcy during the same period. A score that falls below zero indicates a prediction of
bankruptcy.
The Kroeze model made bankruptcy predictions for Air Canada using 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002 and 2003 financial statements. Air Canada did file for bankruptcy in 2003.
Therefore, the model was accurate four years before the event, and consistently made
accurate bankruptcy predictions. See Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. Air Canada’s K-scores, 1999-2003.

The Kroeze model also produced AT A negative K-scores, indicating a bankruptcy
prediction, using financial statement data from 2002 and 2003. AT A filed for bankruptcy
in 2004. Therefore, the model gave an accurate prediction two years before the actual
bankruptcy filing. The model gave bankruptcy predictions in botb 2002 and 2003. See
figure 2 below.

76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ATA
0.15
0.10
0.05
2
8

°

-0.05

1998

1999

2000

200

2002

2003

-0.1 a

-0.15

Year

Figure 2. ATA’s K-scores, 1998-2003

The Kroeze model predicted Hawaiian’s 2003 bankruptcy in 1999. The model was
correct four years prior to the event.

Additionally, the model accurately predicted

Hawaiian’s bankruptcy, five years in a row. See figure 3 below.
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F igures. Hawaiian’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

According to the model, TW A’s scores indicated bankruptcy four years before tbe
actual event in 2001. TWA flew tbeir last official flight in December o f 2001 and were
subsequently liquidated under Chapter 7 o f tbe bankruptcy code. See Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4. TW A’s K-scores, 1998-2001.

United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2003. Its K-scores indicated bankruptcy in
2001. Their K scores were consistently negative for three years. As o f the time of this
writing, United is still operating under bankruptcy protection, and is still in financial
distress. As discussed earlier. United applied for federal loan guarantees three times.
They have been turned down all three times. See figure 5 below.
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Figure 5. United’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

US Airways filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2002. They then applied for, and
received, a $900 million federal loan guarantee (Maynard, 2004). However, they again
declared bankruptcy in 2004. At the time o f this writing, they are still reorganizing and
operating under bankruptcy protection. Observe that their K-scores are negative for each
year o f this study. See Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6 . US Airway’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Valu Jet, now called AirTran, filed for bankruptcy following a devastating 1996 plane
crash in the Florida Everglades.

It is no surprise, therefore, that their K-scores were

negative for several years after their bankruptcy. In 2003, they earned a positive K-score.
AirTran did not declare bankruptcy during the period o f this study. See Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7. AirTran's K-scores, 1998-2003.

Alaska did not file for bankruptcy, nor did they apply for a federal loan guarantee.
Alaska consistently earned positive K-scores during the period o f this study. See Figure
8.
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Figure 8 . Alaska’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Note that America W est received positive K-scores for 1998 through 2001, but then
received negative K-scores in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, according to the model,
America will file for bankruptcy protection in the near future, as shown in Figure 9.
Also, they did not cam a profit in 2004. America West managers, employees, and
investors should be aware that America West is in financial distress.
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America West
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Figure 9. America W est’s K-Scores, 1998-2003.

As discussed earlier, American was very close to filing for bankruptcy recently. As
shown in Figure 10, the K-score model predicts that American will declare bankruptcy in
the near future. Their K-scores were positive until 2002, when the scores fell below zero.
Additionally, American sustained negative earnings in 2004.
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American
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
-

1998

1999

2000

2001

0.10
Year

Figure 10. American’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Continental has earned positive K-scores over the period o f this study, as shown in
Figure 11. However, they sustained negative earnings in 2004. Investors would be well
advised to monitor Continental’s financial performance.
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Figure 11. Continental’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Interestingly, much has been written recently about D elta’s financial problems. Some
analysts stated that it was only hours away from a bankruptcy filing in 2004 (Maynard).
However, its retained earnings were still positive at the end o f 2003, and the new model
does yet predict its bankruptcy.

However, inspection o f the graph o f its K-scores in

Figure 12 indicates that firm’s financial performance should be closely watched, since its
K-score is very low. Furthermore, Delta suffered the worst losses in the history o f the
airline industry in 2004. An update that includes these 2004 results gives a prediction of
bankruptcy.

This study, however, was restricted to using 1998 to 2003 financial

statements.
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Figure 12. D elta’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Frontier’s scores have been positive since 1999. Their K-seores dropped after the
year 2001, as shown in Figure 13. Frontier applied, and received, federal loan
guarantees, as discussed earlier. They did not earn a bankruptcy prediction.
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Frontier

c/5 0.15

Figure 13. Frontier’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

JetBlue, a low-eost carrier, has been a publicly owned entity only since 2001. Their
score, in 2001, was negative, which is expected for a new firm, as shown in Figure 14.
They, and Southwest, have been the only airlines to earn profits in recent years.
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Figure 14. JetBlue’s K-scores, 2001-2003.

Northwest has not earned a profit in years, and as such, is predicted to file for
bankruptcy in the near future. As shown in Figure 15, their K-seores are negative over
the entire length o f this study. Poor financial performance like this cannot be sustained
indefinitely.
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Figure 15. Northwest’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

Southwest has been the airline industry’s star performer. As shown below in Figure
16, their K-scores have been positive over the length o f this study. It is interesting to
note that their score dips a little in the year 2 0 0 1 , the year o f the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
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Figure 16. Southwest’s K-scores, 1998-2003.

General Implications
The Kroeze model predicted that America West will file for bankruptcy, as well as
American and Northwest. As o f the date o f this writing, these airlines have not filed for
bankruptcy. However, none o f these airlines produced a profit in 2004. Further, America
West had negative retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Also, American had negative
retained earnings in 2002 and 2003.

Finally, Northwest has had negative retained

earnings for the entire period o f the study, 1998-2003. These facts suggest that America
West, American, and Northwest are in financial distress and, according to the Kroeze
model, will file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the near future. Inspection o f the
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graphs indicate that Delta, Northwest, America West, and American all appear to be in
financial distress. Their K-scores are below, or very close to, zero. One would ideally
want to use the 2004 financial report for up-to-date predictions.
The issue arises that the Kroeze model may only work for the time since the events of
September 11, 2001. With this is mind, it is known that TWA filed for bankruptcy in
1995, which is, o f course, a time well before 2001. TW A’s K-score for the year 1994
was calculated as -.33. This K-score is well below zero, and would have generated a
bankruptcy prediction for TWA. Thus, the model’s strength is supported by this analysis.
Financial ratios appear to work well to help predict bankruptcy up to four years ahead
o f the event. Further studies, however, should be undertaken on other industries over a
recent period.
The statistical significance o f each predictor variable is shown below in Figures 17
and 18. All four variables had F values that were statistically significant (p<.005, d f 88 ).
Additionally, the tolerance levels were all over 0.1, which indicates that multicollinearity
is not a problem.
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Figure 17. Predictor variables and significance.
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Figure 18. Analysis o f variance.

Jackknifed (leave-one-out) Classification
SPSS provides a jackknifed or leave-one-out classification. In this classification, the
data from the firm are left out when the coefficients used to assign it to a group are
computed. This is a method o f cross-validation to ensure validity and generalizability of
the results. When the original and cross-validated proportions are the same or similar, the
results are consistent and classification is valid (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). As seen in
Figure 19, the results are 75.6 percent o f original groups correctly classified and 74.4
percent o f cross-validated groups correctly classified. These proportions are similar.
Therefore, the results are consistent and the elassification is valid.
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Predicted Group
Membership
B1N2
Original

Count
Percent

Cross
validated

(a)

Count
Percent

1.00

1.00

Total

2.00
16

17

33

2.00

5

52

57

1.00

48.5

51.5

100.0

2.00

8.8

91.2

100.0

1.00

15

18

33

2.00

5

52

57

1.00

45.5

54.5

100.0

2.00

8.8

91.2

100.0

a Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by
the functions derived from all cases other than that case,
b 75.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified,
c 74.4% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.

Figure 19. Classification table.

Unequal Sample Size and Missing Data
There were 90 cases.

The 90 cases, obtained from 1998 through 2003 financial

reports, included five Air Canada cases, six Hawaiian Air cases, four TWA cases, six US
Airways cases, six United cases, six America West cases, six Frontier cases, six Alaska
cases, six American cases, six Continental cases, six Northwest cases, six Southwest
cases, three JetBlue cases, six Delta cases, six AT A cases, and six Air Tran cases.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) state that there are no special problems posed by
unequal sample sizes using MDA.

There were 33 cases in the bankrupt group and 57

cases in the non-bankrupt group that were used to create the discriminant function. The
sample size of the smallest group, 33, exceeded the number o f predictor variables, five.
During classification, unequal sample sizes o f the two groups, bankrupt and non
bankrupt, were used to modify the probabilities with which cases are classified into
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groups. Had this not been done, the MDA program would have used a default probability
o f 50 percent chance o f bankruptcy and 50 percent chance o f non-bankruptcy.

Linearity
The independent variables were linearly related to the dependent variable in the new
model, as shown below in the scatterplots in Figure 20. By inspection, it appears that the
independent variables have a roughly linear relationship to the dependent variable.
Therefore, the assumption o f linearity was met and data transformation was not
necessary.
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Figure 20. Linearity.
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Equality o f Variances
A Levene test for equality o f variances was performed on the two groups, bankrupt
and non-bankrupt (Figure 21). The statistical significance was such that one can accept
the hypothesis that the two population variances are equal (Norusis, 2001). Therefore,
the assumption o f equal variances was met.
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Figure 21. Levene’s test for equality o f variances.

Multicollinearity and Singularity
SPSS 12 was used for the major analysis, which protects against multicollinearity
through checks o f tolerance.

The tolerances were all higher than 0.1.

multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem (Figure 22).
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Therefore,
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Figure 22. Collinearity tolerance.
Outliers
Discriminant analysis is sensitive to the inclusion o f outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2001). Therefore, a test was run for univariate and multivariate outliers for each group
separately, both bankrupt and non-bankrupt. A very conservative criterion for
multivariate outliers is Mahalanobis distance at a significance level /?<.001. There were
four variables in the Z” model; therefore, the critical value o f A ^(4)=l8.467. Thus, any
case with a Mahalanobis distance greater than 18.467 was treated as a multivariate
outlier. Using SPSS 12.0, the Mahalanobis distance was obtained by running a dummy
regression and saving it as a new variable in the data set.

See Appendix, Figures 23 and

24.
A dummy regression was run using the three variables Xi, X 2, and X 4 as independent
variables and the K scores as the dependent variable in order to obtain Mahalanobis
distances.

There were no outliers among the K scores.

However, there were a few

extreme variable values found among the independent variables. All o f the values were
verified and were found to be correct.
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Box plots of the predictor variables and independent variable were run (Appendix,
Figures 25, 26, 27, and 28). Three cases had unusual values for Xi, the working capital
to total asset ratio. One case corresponded to Hawaiian Air, which in 2002, had large,
negative working capital.

Another case represented Frontier, which also had large,

negative working capital.

The last case corresponded to Air Tran, which had large,

positive working capital. The cases were verified, found to be correct, and were kept in
the analysis. Incidentally, it is not unusual for airlines to show a negative working capital
amount, as passengers pay for seats on flights before the flights are actually taken.
Among the X 2 variable values, one case had an unusual value; Air Tran’s 1999 retained
earnings to total assets ratio was very low. The data was verified and found to be correct.
Among the X4 variable values, was one extreme value found: Hawaiian Air, 1998. The
value was checked and verified. Hawaiian, classified as bankrupt, had had a relatively
healthy owners’ equity to total liabilities ratio in 1998. All o f these extreme values were
found to be correct, and they were also retained in the analysis.

Normality
The sample sizes used in this study were large enough (i.e., more than 20) to suggest
normality of the sampling distributions o f means.

No tests are currently feasible for

testing the normality o f all linear combinations o f the sampling distributions o f means of
predictors. However, Q-Q plots (Appendix, Figures 29 30, 31, 32) o f the three predictor
variables and the dependent variable seores suggest univariate normality.

The points

cluster around a straight line which suggests that the data were from a normal distribution
(Norusis, 2001).
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Summary
This chapter showed that the Kroeze model for predieting airline firm bankruptcy was
far superior to the Z” model. The Kroeze model used only three variables, predicted
membership to only one o f two groups, and used a simple zero as a cut-off to distinguish
whether a firm belonged to the bankrupt group or the non-bankrupt group. Furthermore,
the Kroeze model’s predictions were accurate up to four years in advance o f a bankruptcy
filing. Additionally, its results were statistically significant. All o f the assumptions of
MDA were tested and met. The Z” model, on the other hand, used four variables, did not
always give a classification to one o f two groups, and used two eut-offs. Furthermore, it
performed no better than a naïve prediction in determining whether an airline firm should
have been classified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt.
The final chapter of this work summarizes the study and discusses the status of
each airline firm. The implications o f the test o f the hypotheses are discussed, as well as
possibilities for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings o f this dissertation, and reviews
the implications that stem from those findings.

In the first section of the chapter, a

summary o f the study and a discussion o f the findings are presented. Then, some general
implications arising from the study are discussed. This is followed by a discussion o f the
study’s limitations. The chapter coneludes with suggestions for future research.

Summary o f the Study
This dissertation discussed the state o f the airline industry and corporate bankruptcy
prediction models. The Altman Z”-Score model (Z” model) was tested for its capacity to
predict airline firm bankruptcy, using financial statements from the period 1998-2003. A
new model was created, using MDA and three o f the four Z” m odel’s predictor variables.
Both of these models were compared against the results o f a naïve prediction. The Z”
model performed no better than a naïve prediction in predicting airline firm bankruptcy.
The new three variable model, however, was able to predict airline firm bankruptcy quite
accurately up to four years before the actual event.
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Findings
The Kroeze model calculates a score which, if negative, indicates a classification of
bankruptcy. If the score is positive, a classification o f non-bankruptcy is indicated.
In the Kroeze model, the most important predictor o f bankruptcy is the variable that
represents retained earnings divided by total assets. It makes intuitive sense that negative
retained earnings would spell financial distress for an airline. A firm can not sustain net
losses for an extended amount o f time without failing.
The Kroeze model predicted that Air Canada, Hawaiian, and US Airways would go
bankrupt four years before the actual occurrence of their bankrupteies.

The Kroeze

model predicted that TWA would go bankrupt three years before it did. It also predicted
that AT A would go bankrupt two years prior to the actual event, and that United would
go bankrupt one year prior to its actual bankruptcy filing. This situation constitutes good
prediction accuracy up to four years before the actual event occurs.
The Kroeze model predicted that Ameriea West will file bankruptcy, as well as
American and Northwest. As o f the date o f this writing, these airlines have not filed for
bankruptcy. However, none o f these airlines produced a profit in 2004. Further, America
West had negative retained earnings in 2002 and 2003. Also, American had negative
retained earnings in 2002 and 2003.

Finally, Northwest has had negative retained

earnings for the entire period o f the study, 1998-2003. These facts suggest that America
West, American, and Northwest are in financial distress and could file for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in the near future.
airline’s K-score graph.

See Figures 6 through 21 below for each

Graphs o f the six major or national airlines that filed for

bankruptcy between 1998 and 2004 are shown first, followed by graphs o f the ten major
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or national airlines that did not file for bankruptcy during the same period. Scores below
zero indicate a prediction o f bankruptcy.
Interestingly, much has been written recently about Delta’s financial problems. Some
analysts stated that it was only hours away from a bankruptcy filing in 2004 (Maynard,
2004). However, its retained earnings were still positive at the end o f 2003, and the new
model does not yet predict its bankruptcy. However, inspection o f the graph o f its Kscores in Figure 17 indicates that firm’s financial performance should be closely watched,
since its K-score is very low.

General Implications
Inspection o f the graphs indicate that Delta, Northwest, Ameriea West, and American
all appear to be in financial distress. Their K-scores are below, or very close to, zero.
One would ideally want the 2004 financial report for an up-to-date prediction.
Financial ratios appear to work well to help predict bankruptcy up to four years ahead
o f the event. Further studies, however, should be undertaken on other industries over a
recent period.
The transportation industry is critical to the economy to the United States.
Hospitality and tourism, for example, rely on the movement o f consumers as a crucial
part o f their business.

Reliable, affordable air transport allows people to conduct

business effeetively and enjoy leisure activities away from home. The airline industry
employs millions o f people, directly and indirectly. There are many stakeholders in the
future o f the airline industry including travelers, employees, and investors.
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Key Limitations
This study did not include financial ratios from 2004 annual reports.

The 2004

financial statements were not yet available at the time of this writing. This study cannot
be generalized to all airlines. Only publicly owned airlines were analyzed in this study.
This study cannot be generalized to other service industry firms. Further studies should
be done to test the new model on relatively homogenous industries, using recent data,
especially restaurants.
Financial statement data is based on historical costs and accrual accounting. As such,
assets are not shown at current value or replacement value. Net income is not the same as
cash flow.

Depreciafion uses estimates o f the expected life o f a long-ferm asset.

Airlines, for example, use the historical costs o f their purchased jets, rather than current
value or replacement value.

Therefore, accounting data must be used with these

weaknesses in mind.
Some firms have conducted off-balance sheet transactions. Although US Airways,
for example, stated in its financial statements that there were no off-balance sheet
transactions, there is the possibility that firms can effectively hide debt. This study did
not seek to discover hidden debt.
There are weaknesses associated with the use o f MDA to predict corporate
bankruptcy. The variances o f the two groups, bankrupt and non-bankrupt, must be the
same. This condition was met in this study; however, this may not always be the case.
Additionally, the predictor ratios must be normally distributed. Again, this may not
always be true, as it was in this study. Different researchers have used between one and
seven ratios in their discriminant functions: Deakin (1972); Edmister (1972); and Beaver
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(1967).

Some researchers developed bankruptcy prediction models using the logit

technique (Ohlson, 1980) because they felt that violating M DA’s assumptions was
unimportant.

Suggestions for Future Research
The results o f this study should be studied to determine if the K-score is a measure of
the overall financial health of the airline. It may be possible that the K-score’s magnitude
is meaningful.
Additional data needs to be analyzed.

When 2004 financial reports for the same

sixteen airlines become available, the airlines’ new scores should be calculated and
revised predictions should be made.
Other statistical techniques might be tested.

As mentioned above, in cases where

some o f the assumptions o f MDA may not be met, it may be useful to employ logit
analysis.
The Kroeze model should be tested on the restaurant business, using recent financial
data.

W hether or not this bankruptcy prediction model is suitable for other service

businesses is unknown. Altman states that a bankruptcy prediction model that utilizes a
homogeneous group of bankrupt companies and data as near to the present as possible is
ideal.
The practical and theoretical applications o f bankruptcy prediction models are many
and varied.

These include banking and credit analysis, and the assessment of an

individual firm’s financial condition. Other suggestions for future research include: 1)
perform a study o f airline financial performance for the years before September 11, 2001,
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and after September 11, 2001 to see if results are the same. This will help offset the
notion that this study was flawed by the impact of the events o f September 11, 2001. Not
every airline filed for bankruptcy after that time. 2) Look at airline stock prices and
compare to the Kroeze model’s predictions to determine how well the market predicted
bankruptcy; and, 3) develop a probit model that creates a dependent variable to be
defined as the probability o f bankruptcy.

Summary
This study has shown that financial ratios can be used to predict airline firm
bankruptcy. The accuracy o f a traditional model was tested. The traditional model did
not predict airline firm bankruptcy accurately. A new, simpler model was developed, the
Kroeze model. This new model was quite accurate in predicting airline firm bankruptcy
up to four years ahead o f the actual event.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Predicted Value

-.6927

.1186

-.1871

.23267

33

Std. Predicted Value

-2.173

1.314

.000

1.000

33

.000

.000

.000

.000

33

Adjusted Predicted Value

-.6927

.1186

-.1871

.23267

33

Residual

.00000

.00000

.00000

.00000

33

Std. Residual

-1.576

1.612

.000

.952

33

Standard Error of
Predicted Value

Stud. Residual

-1.690

1.693

.012

1.026

33

Deleted Residual

.00000

.00000

.00000

.00000

33

Stud. Deleted Residual

-1.749

1.752

.011

1.042

33

Mahal. Distance

.294

15.398

2.909

3.110

33

Cook's Distance

.000

.396

.048

.076

33

Centered Leverage Value

.009

.481

.091

.097

33

a Dependent Variable: K-Score

Figure 23. Mahalanobis Distance, Kroeze Model.

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Predicted Value

-.3556

.4636

.1039

.19028

57

Std. Predicted Value

-2.415

1.890

.000

1.000

57

.000

.000

.000

.000

57

Adjusted Predicted Value

-.3556

.4636

.1066

.19094

56

Residual

.00000

.00000

.00000

.00000

57

Std. Residual

-1.905

2.112

.000

.973

57

Standard Error of
Predicted Value

Stud. Residual

-1.964

2.170

.003

1.018

56

Deleted Residual

.00000

.00000

.00000

.00000

56

Stud. Deleted Residual

-2.020

2.252

.003

1.029

56

Mahal. Distance

.392

10.858

2.947

2.377

57

Cook's Distance

.000

.113

.020

.024

56

Centered Leverage Value

.007

.194

.053

.042

57

a Dependent Variable: K-Score

Figure 24. Mahalanobis Distance, Kroeze Model, Non-Bankrupt Group.
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Figure 25. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 26. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 27. Predictor Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 28. Dependent Variable Box Plots, Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Groups.
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Figure 29. Test for Normality o f Predictor Xi.
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Figure 30. Test for Normality o f Predictor X 2.
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Figure 31. Test for Normality of Predictor X 3.
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Figure 32. Test for Normality for K-Scores.
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0.75

A nalysis C ase Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases
Valid

N
Missing or out-of
range group codes

Excluded

At least one
missing
discriminating
variable
Both missing or
out-of-range group
codes and at least
one missing
discriminating
variable
Total
Total

Percent
90

100.0

0

.0

0

.0

0

.0

0

.0

90

100.0

Group Statistics
Valid N (listwise)
Mean

B1N2
1.00

2.00

Total

Std. Deviation

Unweighted

Weighted

XI

-.0888

.11972

33

33.000

X2

-.1941

.23495

33

33.000

X4

-.0056

.24110

33

33.000

XI

-.0214

.11142

57

57.000

X2

.0830

.18569

57

57.000

X4

.3580

.35791

57

57.000

XI

-.0461

.11847

90

90.000

X2

-.0186

.24407

90

90.000

X4

.2247

.36409

90

90.000

Tests of Equaiity of Group Means
Wilks'
Lambda

F

d fl

df2

Sig.

XI

.924

7.256

1

88

.008

X2

.697

38.189

1

88

.000

X4

.766

26.923

1

88

.000

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Pooled W ithin-Groups Matrices(a)

XI
Covariance

Correlation

X1

X4

X2
.013

.003

.012

X2

.003

.042

.047

X4

.012

.047

.103

X1

1.000

.135

.316

X2

.135

1.000

.723

X4

.316

.723

1.000

a The covariance matrix has 88 degrees of freedom.

Covariance Matrices(a)
B1N2
1.00

2.00

Total

XI

X4

X2

XI

.014

.011

.008

X2

.011

.055

.044

X4

.008

.044

.058

XI

.012

-.001

.013

X2

-.001

.034

.049

X4

.013

.049

.128

XI

.014

.008

.017

X2

.008

.060

.071

X4

.017

.071

.133

a The total covariance matrix has 89 degrees of freedom.

Log Determinants

B1N2
1.00

Log
Determinant

Rank
3

-11.098

2.00

3

-11.000

Pooled within-groups

3

-10.645

The ranks and natural logarithms of determinants printed are those of the group covariance matrices.

Test Results
Box's M
F

34.361
Approx.

5.492

dfl

6

df2

29416.901

Sig.

.000

Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices.
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Eigenvalues

Function
1

Eigenvalue

% of Variance

Cumulative %

100.0

100.0

.477(a)

Canonical
Correlation
.568

a First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.

Wilks' Lambda

Test of Function(s)
1

Wilks'
Lambda
.677

df

Chi-square
33.712

Sig.
3

.000

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
Function
1
XI

.268

X2

.838

X4

.111

Structure Matrix
Function
1
X2

.954

X4

.801

XI

.416

Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant
functions Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.

Functions at Group Centroids
Function
B1N2

1

1.00

-.897

2.00

.519

Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means
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Classification Processing Summary

Processed

90

Excluded

Missing or out-of
range group codes

0

At least one missing
discriminating
variable

0

Used in Output

90

Prior Probabilities for Groups
Cases Used in
Analysis

B1N2

Prior

1.00

.367

33

33.000

.633

57

57.000

1.000

90

90.000

Unweighted
2.00
Total

Weighted

Classification Results (b,c)
Predicted Group
Membership
B1N2
Original

Count
%

Grossvalidated(

Count

°)

%

1.00

Total

2.00

1.00

16

17

33

2.00

5

52

57

1.00

48.5

51.5

100.0

2.00

8.8

91.2

100.0

1.00

15

18

33

2.00

5

52

57

1.00

45.5

54.5

100.0

2.00

8.8

91.2

100.0

a Gross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by
the functions derived from all cases other than that case,
b 75.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified,
c 74.4% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified.
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